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Chapter 1
Introduction
Being labeled as a social science, much of economics is about under-
standing human behavior; be it in the face of uncertainty or delayed payoﬀs
through time or strategic situations such as auctions, bargaining, and so on.
This thesis will be concerned with the ﬁrst two, namely uncertainty and time
preferences.
The main focus of this thesis is what we can summarize with two broad
titles: “irrationalities” in human behavior and an alternative perspective on
“rational behavior”. My claim requires a clariﬁcation of what is meant by
rational or irrational behavior. In one of the early discussions of this topic,
Richter (1966) deﬁned a rational consumer as someone for whom there exists
a total, reﬂexive, and transitive binary relation on the set of commodities so
that his choice data consists of maximal elements of this binary relation. In
this respect, Richter (1966) only imposed minimal consistency conditions on
behavior for it to be labeled as rational. Although his setting does not in-
volve any uncertainty or time dimension, analogues of these conditions exist
for the models we consider here as well. So one can extend the rationality
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notion of Richter (1966) to our models too. Yet the essence of his approach to
rationality is diﬀerent than the one we take up in this thesis. This minimal-
istic approach of Richter would leave little space for discussions on rational
behavior because much behavior would be rational except for a few cleverly
constructed counterexamples. Instead we will consider more widely accepted
norms of rationality and analyze them in the framework of uncertainty and
time preferences.
The widely accepted norms of rationality mentioned above are understood
to be axioms that lead to decision rules describing people’s behavior. In the
case of decision making under risk and uncertainty the most commonly used
decision model is expected utility, and in the case of dynamic decision making,
it is the constant discounted utility model. Although there are models that
combine both to explain decision making in a dynamic stochastic settings,
in this thesis we study them in isolation to assess the nature of the models
in more detail.
Uncertainty and Risk
Attempts to study human behavior in a stochastic environment were mostly
done through calculating the expected value of a given random variable until
the appearance of the famous St. Petersburg Paradox in 18th century. This
paradox was ﬁrst put forward in a letter by Nicolas Bernoulli (de Montmort
1713). The paradox presents a game of chance where a coin is ﬂipped until
a tail shows up, at which stage the game ends. If the tail shows up in the
ﬁrst round, the payoﬀ to the player is 2, if tail shows up in the second round
for the ﬁrst time the payoﬀ is 4, if the tail shows up in the third round the
payoﬀ is 8, and so on. It is easy to see that the probability of tail showing up
in the nth round is 1/2n in which case the payoﬀ is 2n. Hence the expected
3value of the game is 1 + 1 + . . . which is inﬁnite. This presents a paradox in
that nobody would pay large sums of money to play this game. Therefore it
suggests that we need valuations other than expected value for some gambles.
Daniel Bernoulli came up with a suggested solution to the paradox (Bernoulli
1738). Since then his suggestion, to use expected utility rather than expected
value, has been the most commonly used tool to analyze individual choice in
stochastic environments in economics and other social sciences.
To this day expected utility theory has been widely accepted to be norma-
tively superior to many other models of choice under risk and uncertainty.
However its descriptive power has been challenged by the Allais paradox
(Allais (1953)) and the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg (1961)). After these two
famous examples, many other counterexamples violating expected utility the-
ory were provided (see Tversky and Kahneman (1979) for a nice set of early
examples). After these series of ﬁndings questioning the descriptive power
of expected utility, a new theory has been developed to explain choice under
uncertainty, namely prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1979, 1992).
In the second chapter of this thesis, we analyze an environment in which
there is uncertainty in the sense that the probabilities of events are not
given. We study expected utility and deviations from it in an experimental
setting. In particular we are interested in the way in which people change
their behavior upon receipt of new information regarding the possible events.
In standard expected utility, it is assumed that people update their beliefs
(their subjective probabilities of relevant events) in accordance with Bayes’
rule. Yet there is ample empirical evidence showing that although people do
update their beliefs, this updating procedure need not comply with Bayes’
rule (Grether 1980, El-Gamal and Grether 1995). Further, in expected util-
ity, utilities that arise from outcomes are weighted by the agents’ subjec-
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tive probabilities. However, in decision models such as the aforementioned
prospect theory, utilities are weighted by decision weights that may diﬀer
from subjective probabilities. Hence updating probabilities and updating
decision weights become diﬀerent concepts.
In Chapter 2, we assume that decision makers’ behavior deviates from
the expected utility prescription and their attitudes are instead captured by
neo-additive weighting functions (Chateauneuf et al. 2007). These functions
are transformations of subjective probabilities and are used in determining
decision weights. We designed an experiment and employed a simple method
to elicit neo-additive decision weights. In the experiment, subjects traded
options on the performance of (anonymous) initial public oﬀerings (IPOs)
of new stocks. The reason we chose anonymous IPOs is that this way the
subjects did not have any prior knowledge about the performance of the
stocks. Then we gave them information about the returns of the stocks and
observed how they changed their attitudes upon receipt of these pieces of
new information. We found that as people receive new information, they
became closer to the behavior that one would see from an expected utility
maximizer. If we take expected utility as a benchmark for rationality, then
this ﬁnding suggests that information makes people behave more rationally.
However, we still observed that people deviated from expected utility even
when they had more and more information.
In the Chapter 3, we focus on one of the axioms of Bayesian expected util-
ity namely the independence of events. We use informational independence
in characterizing diﬀerent models of ambiguity (unknown probabilities). In
the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) axiomatization of expected utility, this notion
of independence is implicitly used. In their setting, they use two diﬀerent
types of events: unknown probability events (horse lotteries) and events with
5known probabilities (roulette lotteries).
In the Anscombe-Aumann setting, roulette lotteries are assumed to be in-
dependent of horse lotteries. We show that for the separable representation of
preferences this has to be reversed; i.e., one had better assume independence
of horse lotteries from roulette lotteries or otherwise a separability paradox
results.
We also show that symmetry of independence is necessary and suﬃcient
for expected utility to hold. We further characterize some models other than
expected utility using this notion of independence.
Intertemporal Choice
If a historian of economic thought were to study the branches of decision
making that specialize in behavior under risk and uncertainty on the one hand
and intertemporal choice on the other, she would encounter many similarities.
And just like expected utility was (and to a great extent still is) the prominent
theory for a long time when there is uncertainty involved, constant discounted
utility (with or without linear utility) was the prominent theory of dynamic
decision making. Just like the second part of the last century witnessed
experimental challenges towards expected utility, constant discounted utility
was also questioned on empirical grounds. These two theories share the
common normative appeal whereas they lack descriptive power. This led
researchers to develop new tools for analyzing decision making in dynamic
environments.
The functional forms that represent preferences in intertemporal settings
also have behavioral foundations. In the Chapter 4 of this thesis, we present
a new tool, the subjective present value, that can be used in characterizing
six diﬀerent decision rules that are commonly used in economics, including
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constant discounted utility.
We deﬁne the present value as follows: Suppose that a decision maker is
endowed with a stream of payments spread over future dates and also the
present. Then suppose that at some future date we add an amount x to
the current endowment at that date. The amount that the decision maker
would ask for (without the additional x in future) at present time so that
she would be indiﬀerent to the stream with the extra x in the future is called
the present value of x in our setting.
We characterize six commonly used models of intertemporal choice in
ﬁnance and economics by using this present value. It is a more natural
tool than other axioms that were previously used in characterizing these
models because present values are commonly used in economics and ﬁnance
and decision makers are familiar with the concept. Therefore this method
can more easily be tested empirically, which is an important reason why
behavioral axioms must exist in the ﬁrst place.
As stated in the beginning, the commonly used models mentioned above
were empirically challenged. Models with more descriptive power were sug-
gested due to these challenges. The last chapter of this thesis studies two
such models, namely variation aversion and decreasing impatience, that can
accommodate common violations of constant discounted utility. Both models
were characterized before using cumbersome axioms. This chapter presents
their characterizations in terms of a new preference condition based on the
present value.
To summarize, this thesis has studied some irrationalities in human be-
havior and also presented novel approaches to deﬁning rational behavior. In
the second chapter, we set up an experiment that replicates investment be-
havior in ﬁnancial markets and veriﬁed departures from expected utility and
7also that subjects become more rational as they receive information related
to unknown events. In the third chapter, we used informational independence
to characterize some decision models used for uncertainty. We also pointed
to a paradox that results from the way informational independence is im-
plicitly used in Anscombe-Aumann setting and provided an alternative that
corrects this paradox. The fourth chapter introduced a natural tool, sub-
jective present value, and used it to give novel characterizations of diﬀerent
decision models of intertemporal choice. The last chapter is an extension of
the fourth one and uses the concept of present value to characterize some de-
partures from rational models of intertemporal choice. With all these results,
this thesis has shed new light on what is meant by rational and irrational
behavior. We carried out our study in the domain of uncertainty and in-
tertemporal choice only. Future research may take up a similar approach for
diﬀerent situations as well.
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Abstract
This paper studies the eﬀect of learning new information on peoples
beliefs and their attitudes towards ambiguity. We propose a method
to separate ambiguity attitudes from subjective probabilities and to
decompose ambiguity attitudes into pessimism (capturing ambiguity
aversion) and likelihood insensitivity. We apply our method in an
experiment where we elicit the ask prices of options with payoﬀs de-
pending on the returns of initial public oﬀerings (IPOs) on the New
York Stock Exchange. IPOs are a natural context in which to study
the eﬀect of learning, as no prior information about returns is avail-
able. The results indicate that there was signiﬁcant likelihood in-
sensitivity, which diminished with more information. We found little
pessimism, which was largely unaﬀected as new information became
available. Subjective probabilities were well-calibrated and close to
true frequencies. Subjects behavior moved towards expected utility
with more information, but substantial deviations remained even in
the maximum information condition.
Keywords: ambiguity, learning, updating, neo-additive weighting
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2.1 Introduction
In many real-world decision problems, objective probabilities are unknown
and decisions have to be made under uncertainty. The traditional approach
in decision analysis to analyze such decisions is to assume that the decision
maker assigns subjective probabilities to events, behaves according to ex-
pected utility, and updates his subjective probabilities according to Bayes
rule when new information becomes available. All these assumptions are
open to debate.
First, while people change their beliefs when more information becomes
available and these updated beliefs have predictive value (Hamermesh 1985,
Smith et al. 2001), empirical evidence suggests that they systematically de-
viate from Bayes rule (e.g. Grether 1980, El-Gamal and Grether 1995, Char-
ness and Levin 2005, Hoﬀman et al. 2011, Poinas et al. 2012, and Gallagher
2014). Psychologists have uncovered many updating biases, including under-
and overconﬁdence (Griﬃn and Tversky 1992), conservatism (Phillips and
Edwards 1966), representativeness (Kahneman and Tversky 1972), availabil-
ity (Tversky and Kahneman 1973), and conﬁrmatory bias (Rabin and Schrag
1999).
Second, and even more fundamental, Ellsbergs (1961) paradox, which
shows that people prefer betting on known rather than unknown events,
undermines not only subjective expected utility, but even the existence of
subjective probabilities. To account for Ellsbergs paradox, many new models
of decision under ambiguity have been proposed (for overviews see Wakker
2010, Gilboa and Marinacci forthcoming). While in expected utility decision
weights are equal to subjective probabilities, in these ambiguity models they
also reﬂect the conﬁdence people have in their beliefs and their aversion
towards ambiguity. The ambiguity models capture an intuition expressed
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already in 1921 by Keynes (1921):
’The magnitude of the probability of an argumentdepends upon a balance
between what may be termed the favourable and the unfavourable evidence;
a new piece of evidence which leaves this balance unchanged also leaves the
probability of the argument unchanged. But it seems that there may be
another respect in which some kind of quantitative comparison between ar-
guments is possible. This comparison turns upon a balance, not between the
favourable and the unfavourable evidence, but between the absolute amounts
of relevant knowledge and relevant ignorance respectively [p.71].
In other words, Keynes conjectured that learning new evidence changes
both the balance of evidence (peoples beliefs) and the total amount of ev-
idence (the amount of ambiguity). Under expected utility, the amount of
ambiguity plays no role and learning only aﬀects beliefs. In the ambiguity
models, more information changes both beliefs and ambiguity attitudes and
they make it possible to better understand the eﬀects of learning on behavior.
This raises the question of how decision weights are updated.1 While several
papers have approached this question from a theoretical angle and diﬀerent
rules have been proposed,2 there is a dearth of empirical evidence on how de-
cision weights actually change as more information becomes available3 This
1In the literature the expression updating of non-Bayesian beliefs is sometimes used. To
emphasize that beliefs may diﬀer from subjective probabilities under non-expected utility
we use the term updating of decision weights.
2See Gilboa and Schmeidler 1993, Epstein 2006, Eichberger et al. 2007, Epstein and
Schneider 2007, Hanany and Klibanoﬀ 2007, Eichberger et al. 2010, Eichberger et al.
2012).
3Cohen et al. 2000) and Dominiak et al. 2012) experimentally studied updating un-
der ambiguity but consider situations in which decision makers receive information that
an event cannot occur. In our study decision makers accumulate evidence how often a
particular event has been observed in the past.
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motivated our paper in which we study experimentally how decision makers
change their behavior when more information becomes available.
A diﬃculty in applying the new ambiguity models is that most of these
models involve concepts that are diﬃcult to measure empirically. We present
a simple method to measure ambiguity attitudes. Our method is based on
an insight from Luce (1991) that for binary acts most ambiguity models are
equivalent. We use results from Chateauneuf et al. (2007), to disentangle
subjective probabilities and ambiguity attitudes. Our method describes a de-
cision makers ambiguity attitude by two indices, one reﬂecting his pessimism
(capturing ambiguity aversion) and the other his sensitivity to changes in
likelihood, which, as we show, is closely related to the decision makers am-
biguity perception.
The separation of subjective probabilities and ambiguity attitudes makes
it possible to study whether people behave more in line with expected util-
ity when they receive more information. This would be compatible with a
commonly held view that learning and more information decrease the irra-
tionalities caused by deviations from expected utility (Myagkov and Plott
1997, List 2004, van de Kuilen and Wakker 2006, Ert and Trautmann 2014).
We applied our method in an experiment, where we elicited subjects ask
prices for options with payoﬀs contingent on the returns of (anonymous) ini-
tial public oﬀerings (IPOs). IPOs make it possible to study the eﬀect of
more information in a natural decision context (rather than in a more con-
trived context using urns) for which no prior information is available. The
results indicated that pessimism was stable, whereas likelihood insensitiv-
ity diminished as more information became available. Aggregate subjective
probabilities were close to true frequencies after correction for ambiguity at-
titudes. Subjects behavior moved into the direction of expected utility with
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more information about the historical performance of the stocks. However,
substantial deviations remained even in the maximum information condition.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
Decision Model
A decision maker faces uncertainty about the outcome he will receive at
time T . The decision makers uncertainty is modeled through a ﬁnite state
space ST where the subscript T denotes that the uncertainty will be resolved
at time point T . The state space contains all possible states of the world s,
only one of them ﬁnally occurring. The decision maker does not know which
state will occur. Events are subsets of ST . The decision maker chooses
between acts, mapping ST to an outcome space X. In our experiment the
outcomes were positive money amounts. We considered only binary acts,
denoted by xEy, giving money amount x if event E occurs at time T and
money amount y ≤ x otherwise.
The decision makers information about previous resolutions of uncer-
tainty up to time t < T is formalized by his history set, ht = (s1, . . . , st),
where sj ∈ Sj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t and Sj denotes the state space representing
the uncertainty at time j. Complete absence of information is denoted by h0.
We assume that St = ST = S for all t = 1, . . . , T . In other words, the same
states are available at diﬀerent points in time. The decision makers beliefs
may change over time as more information becomes available. The decision
makers preferences are represented through a history dependent preference
relation t, where the subscript t indicates that preferences depend on the
history ht ( with t and ∼t deﬁned as usual). A real-valued function Vt
represents the t if for all binary acts xEy and zFw, xEy t zFw if and only
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if Vt(xEy) ≥ Vt(zFw).
The traditional Bayesian approach assumes that preferences t are rep-
resented by expected utility, i.e.,
xEy → Pt(E)U(x) + (1− Pt(E))U(y)
where U : S → R a utility function deﬁned over outcomes and Pt the sub-
jective probability measure given ht. In expected utility, new information,
which expands the history set from ht to hv, with v > t, aﬀects probabilities
but leaves utility unchanged. Updating takes place in the belief (subjective
probabilities) part of the representation and tastes (utility) are not inﬂu-
enced by new information about past events. Time-invariant utility is also
commonly assumed in thetheoretical literature on the updating of decision
weights under non-expected utility (e.g. Epstein 2006, Eichberger et al. 2007,
Epstein and Schneider 2007) and we will also assume it in this paper.
To account for deviations from expected utility, we will assume a binary
rank-dependent utility (RDU) model (Miyamoto 1988, Luce 1991, Ghirardato
and Marinacci 2001), which includes many ambiguity models as special cases.
Examples are maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989), alpha-
maxmin expected utility (Ghirardato et al. 2004), contraction expected util-
ity (Gajdos et al. 2008), Choquet expected utility (Schmeidler 1989), and
prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Under binary RDU, t can
be represented by
xEy → Wt(E)U(x) + (1−Wt(E))U(y) (2.1)
with U a real valued function that is unique up to an aﬃne transformation
andWt a unique weighting function
4, which need not be additive but satisﬁes
4Sometimes the term capacity is used instead of decision weight.
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Wt(∅) = 0, Wt(St) = 1 and Wt(A) ≤ Wt(B) if A ⊆ B. The subscript t in
Wt expresses that the decision weight depends on the history ht just like Pt
in the Bayesian approach.
Chateauneuf et al. (2007) used neo-additive decision weights Wt. These
are deﬁned as follows, for a probability measure Pt and parameters at and bt
that satisfy at ≤ 1 and at − 2 ≤ bt ≤ 2− at:
Wt(E) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
at−bt
2
+ (1− at)P t(E) if 0 < at−bt2 + (1− at)P t(E) < 1
0 if at−bt
2
+ (1− at)P t(E) ≤ 0
1 if at−bt
2
+ (1− at)P t(E) ≥ 1
(2.2)
Neo-additive decision weighting assumes that the decision maker is proba-
bilistically sophisticated for a given history, meaning that his decisions can be
rationalized by a probability measure Pt. Because kt and ct may diﬀer across
histories, the decision maker may deviate from probabilistic sophistication
when comparing acts involving diﬀerent histories.
Representation in (1) can be written as:
xEy → (1− at)[Pt(E)U(x) + (1− Pt(E))U(y)]
+
at − bt
2
U(x) +
at + bt
2
U(y) (2.3)
Equation (2.3) is a linear combination of the maximum utility of xEy, the
minimum utility of xEy, and its expected utility. We will refer to (2.3) as the
neo-additive model. Chateauneuf et al. (2007) imposed stronger constraints:
0 ≤ at ≤ 1 and −at ≤ bt ≤ at. This ensures that decision makers are
likelihood insensitive and assign positive weights to extreme outcomes (−at ≤
bt ≤ at). Our (weaker) constraints (at ≤ 1 and at − 2 ≤ bt ≤ 2 − at) also
permit likelihood oversensitivity and zero weights for extreme outcomes.
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Likelihood Insensitivity
The parameter at in (2.3) reﬂects the weight that the decision maker
gives to expected utility in his evaluation of acts. If at is equal to 0 then the
decision maker gives maximum weight to expected utility. Larger values of at
imply that the decision maker gives less weight to expected utility and that
he concentrates more on the maximum and minimum utility. In other words,
the larger at the more the decision maker ignores the relative likelihoods of
x and y. This can also be seen from (2.2), where larger values of at imply
that Pt(E) receives less weight.
Figure 2.1: Likelihood insensitivity: The ﬁgure shows the neo-additive weighting
function with at > 0 and bt = 0. The decision maker is insuﬃciently sensitive to
changes in likelihood. The diagonal shows the weighting function when expected
utility holds.
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Figure 2.1 shows the eﬀect of changes in at when bt is held constant at
0. When at = 0, the decision maker behaves according to expected utility
(dashed line). When at increases, the slope of the decision weighting func-
tion becomes ﬂatter and the decision maker is less sensitive to intermediate
changes in likelihood. As a result, diﬀerences between (non-extreme) decision
weights are less than the diﬀerences between their underlying probabilities.
This is called likelihood insensitivity. We take at as a likelihood insensitivity
index with higher values of at indicating more likelihood insensitivity.
Empirical studies have usually found more likelihood insensitivity for un-
certainty than for risk (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Kahn and Sarin
1988, Kilka and Weber 2001, Abdellaoui et al. 2005, Wakker 2010, ch. 10).
There is also evidence that likelihood insensitivity is stronger for less familiar
sources of uncertainty (Kilka and Weber 2001, Abdellaoui et al. 2011). We
therefore expect that likelihood insensitivity will diminish with the size of
the history set (the amount of information).
Pessimism
Figure 2.2 shows that for a given value of at, increases in bt shift the
weighting functions downwards (by bt/2). As can be seen from Eq. (2.1),
the decision weights reﬂect the weight given to the best outcome and, conse-
quently, increases in bt imply that the decision maker pays more attention to
the worst outcome. We will interpret bt as an index of pessimism with higher
values indicating more pessimism, and negative values reﬂecting optimism.
An expected utility maximizer has at = 0. An extremely pessimistic decision
maker, who only considers the worst outcome regardless of its likelihood, has
bt = 1 and an extremely optimistic decision maker, who only considers the
best outcome, has bt = −1.
Several studies have found that pessimism diminished when the decision
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maker had more knowledge about a source of uncertainty and, probably,
perceived less ambiguity (Heath and Tversky 1991, Kilka and Weber 2001,
Fox and Weber 2002, Di Mauro 2008, and Abdellaoui et al. 2011). Pessimism
captures the decision makers aversion towards ambiguity. More information
may reduce perceived ambiguity, and as the results in the literature suggest,
it may also reduce his pessimism.
Figure 2.2: Pessimism. The solid line corresponds to at > 0 and bt = 0. The
parallel dashed line keeps at constant and increases bt. The ﬁgure shows that for
constant at, increases in bt shift the neo-additive weighting function downwards
leading to an increase in pessimism.
The eﬀect of new information on subjective probabilities on the one hand,
and on likelihood sensitivity and pessimism on the other hand, illustrates
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that modern ambiguity theories capture Keynes (1921) intuition about the
weight and the balance of evidence. If new information changes the balance
of evidence in favor of an event, the decision maker will update his beliefs
accordingly. But this new information also changes the balance between the
absolute amounts of relevant evidence and relevant ignorance. Our approach
reﬂects this by also allowing changes in the decision makers weighting of
subjective probabilities. The new information might make the decision maker
rely more on his beliefs and become more sensitive to likelihood, with at
tending to 0. In section 2.3 we will present a method to disentangle subjective
probabilities, pessimism, and likelihood insensitivity and to obtain subjective
probabilities that are corrected for ambiguity attitudes. An advantage of our
method is that it need not specify an updating rule, because we directly
measure subjective probabilities and decision weights from the data.
Multiple Prior Interpretation of The Neo-additive Model
The above analysis is close to Choquet expected utility (Gilboa 1987,
Schmeidler 1989) and prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) where
ambiguity attitudes are modeled through the decision weighting function.
The multiple-prior models take a diﬀerent approach and model ambiguity
through a set of priors Ct about the true probability measure Pt. Chateauneuf
et al. (2007) showed that the neo-additive model also has a multiple-prior
interpretation that can be rewritten as:
xEy → αt min
π∈Ct
[π(E)U(x) + (1− π(E))U(y)]
+ (1− αt)max
π∈Ct
[π(E)U(x) + (1− π(E))U(y)] (2.4)
where αt =
at+bt
2at
and Ct = {π|π(E) ≥ (1− at)Pt(E)}.
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The set of priors, Ct reﬂects the decision makers perceived ambiguity;
the larger the set of priors, the more ambiguity he perceives. Eq. (2.4)
shows that the set of priors depends on at, which consequently also measures
the decision makers ambiguity perception. The parameter αt reﬂects the
decision makers pessimism. Equation (2.4) is a linear combination of the
lowest and the highest expected utility that the decision maker may obtain
and higher values of αt correspond with more weight to the lowest expected
utility. Increases in bt, our measure of pessimism, lead to increases in αt.
However, αt also depends on at and, therefore, it is a diﬀerent measure of
pessimism than bt.
Equation (2.4) is mathematically equivalent to Eq. (2.3) when at is posi-
tive. We cannot distinguish these interpretations and the reader can choose
the interpretation that he likes best. However, the multiple-prior interpreta-
tion only holds in the natural case (with at positive). Since several subjects
had a negative at, we will use only Eq.(2.3) in the individual analyses. On
the other hand, as the mean value of at was positive we could analyze the
aggregate data under both interpretations.
2.3 Measuring Subjective Probabilities and
Ambiguity Attitudes
We will now explain how we measured at and bt for diﬀerent histories ht. For
each history ht, we considered a three event partition of the state space. The
events were deﬁned by the change in the price of stocks on a speciﬁc trading
day. These events were as follows. Up: the price goes up by at least 0.5%,
Middle: the price varies by less than 0.5%; and Down: the price decreases
by at least 0.5%.We also considered the event MiddleUp=Middle ∪ Up. For
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given x > y, we then elicited four certainty equivalents:
CEUp ∼ xUpy, CEMiddle ∼ xMiddley,
CEDown ∼ xDowny, and CEMiddleUp ∼ xMiddleUpy.
With the normalization U(x) = 1 and U(y) = 0, Eq. (2.1) implies that
U(CEUp) = Wt(Up), U(CEMiddle) = Wt(Middle),
U(CEDown) = Wt(Down), U(CEMiddleUp) = Wt(MiddleUp)
The decision weights of an expected utility maximizer are equal to his sub-
jective probabilities and, consequently, his subjective probabilities are equal
to the utilities of his certainty equivalents. Thus under expected utility,
U(CEMiddleUp) + U(CEDown) = Pt(MiddleUp) + Pt(Down) = 1
We will refer to this property as complementarity. The neo-additive model
allows for violations of complementarity:
U(CEMiddleUp) + U(CEDown) =
at − bt
2
+ (1− at)Pt(MiddleUp) + at − bt
2
+ (1− at)Pt(Down)
= 1− bt. (2.5)
Equation (2.5) shows that a neo-additive decision maker violates comple-
mentarity if bt = 0 and and that more pessimism leads to a lower sum of
U(CEMiddleUp) +U(CEDown). Hence, studying deviations of this sum allows
us to identify the decision makers degree of pessimism.
Under expected utility, the decision maker should also satisfy binary ad-
ditivity:
U(CEUp) + U(CEMiddle)− U(CEMiddleUp)
Pt(Up) + Pt(Middle)− Pt(MiddleUp) = 0
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Under the neo-additive model, we obtain,
U(CEUp) + U(CEMiddle)− U(CEMiddleUp) = at − bt
2
(2.6)
Equation (2.6) shows that the neo-additive model predicts violations of bi-
nary additivity if at = bt. The neo-additive model makes it possible to
measure pessimism and likelihood insensitivity for any events if utility is
known. To measure utility we used the method of Abdellaoui et al. 2008,
which we will explain in Section 2.4. Once we know at, bt, and U , we can also
determine Pt. If at or bt is unequal to zero, expected utility does not hold
and the subjective probabilities that we measure under expected utility will
be non-additive: either complementarity or binary additivity will not hold.
Our method takes this non-additivity into account and measures subjective
probabilities Pt that are corrected for ambiguity attitudes.
2.4 Experiment
2.4.1 Subjects
The experiment was run at Erasmus University in May 2011 with 66 subjects
(22 female) with a background in ﬁnance. Subjects were either third year
undergraduate students with a major in ﬁnance or graduate students in ﬁ-
nance. Their average age was 24 years, ranging from 21 years to 33 years. We
deliberately selected students from ﬁnance because the experimental ques-
tions involved options and we hoped that ﬁnance students would ﬁnd the
experimental tasks easier to understand and would be more motivated to
answer the questions. Each subject received a show-up fee of 5 euros and in
addition each subject played out one of his choices for real using a procedure
described below.
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2.4.2 Method
The experiment was computer-run in small group sessions involving at most
3 subjects. Subjects ﬁrst received instructions and were asked to answer
several questions to check their understanding of the experimental tasks.
The experimental instructions including the questions to check for subjects
understandings are in Appendix 2.B. Subjects could only proceed to the
actual experiment after they had answered all test questions correctly.
The source of uncertainty that we used was the variation in the returns
on the stocks of IPOs (Initial Public Oﬀerings) traded at the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE). IPOs are new stocks that have just entered the market.
We chose IPOs for two reasons. First, the returns on stocks are a natural
source of uncertainty unlike, for example, Ellsberg urns. Second, because
IPOs are new on the market, there is no price history and learning occurs
naturally.
We used data on 328 IPOs in total. All stocks were listed on the NYSE
between 1 September 2009 and 25 February 2011. At the start of the exper-
iment, each subject drew 4 numbers which determined the stocks he would
trade. Subjects did not know which stocks they traded. The identities of
the traded stocks were only revealed after subjects had completed the exper-
iment. We explained subjects how they could verify the stock data on the
internet should they wish to do so.
Payoﬀs were determined by the performance of the stock on the 21st
trading day after their introduction on the NYSE. We deﬁned four events:
Up:(0.5,+∞), i.e. the stock goes up by more than 0.5% on the 21st trading
day, Middle:[−0.5, 05], the stock varies by at most 0.5% on the 21st trading
day, Down:(−∞, 0.5), the stock goes down by more than 0.5% on the 21st
trading day, and Middle-Up:(−0.5,+∞), the stock goes up by more than -
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0.5% on the 21st trading day. In what follows, we will refer to an option that
pays x if event Up obtains as an Up(U )-option. Middle-(M ), Down-(D),
and Middle-Up(MU ) options are deﬁned similarly. We used the variation
in the stock returns rather than the absolute prices of the stocks to make
sure subjects had no information about the stocks and to avoid biases. For
example, stocks with higher prices might attract more attention leading to
biases in the elicited subjective probabilities and ambiguity attitudes.
Table 2.1: The 20 Choice Questions
Stk Cond y x Optn Stk Cond y x Optn
1 No Inf 0 10 U 3 1 W 0 20 U
1 No Inf 10 20 U 3 1 W 0 20 M
1 No Inf 5 20 U 3 1 W 0 20 D
1 No Inf 10 15 U 3 1 W 0 20 MU
1 No Inf 0 5 U 3 1 W 0 20 M
1 No Inf 0 20 U 4 1 M 0 20 U
2 No Inf 0 20 U 4 1 M 0 20 M
2 No Inf 0 20 M 4 1 M 0 20 D
2 No Inf 0 20 D 4 1 M 0 20 MU
2 No Inf 0 20 MU 4 1 M 0 20 D
Table 2.1: The columns labeled ’Stk’ refer to the four diﬀerent stocks subjects
faced. The questions for stock 1 were used to measure utility. The columns labeled
’Cond’ refer to the amount of information subjects received about the historical
performance of the stock. ’No Inf’, ’1 W’ and ’1 M’ correspond to no information,
1 week and 1 month information cases respectively. ’Opt’ columns refer to option
type and indicate event E. Options were of the type xEy where the subject received
x euros if event E occurred and y euros otherwise.
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There were three informational conditions, each involving a diﬀerent his-
tory set. In the no information condition (history set h0), subjects had no
information about the underlying stock. In the one week condition (history
set h5), subjects were informed about the daily returns of the stock in the
ﬁrst 5 trading days following its introduction. Finally, in the one month
condition (history set h20), subjects were informed about the performance of
the stock in the ﬁrst 20 trading days following its introduction.
Figure 2.3: The choice lists used in the experiment. In this example the option
pays 20 euros if event MU occurs on the 21st trading day after the introduction
of the stock and 0 otherwise.
We used choice lists to elicit the ask prices of 20 options, summarized
in Table 2.1. The ask prices were determined through choice lists. Figure
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2.3 gives an example of a choice list for a MiddleUp option. Subjects were
told that they owned the option xEy and they were asked for each price
on the choice list whether they wanted to sell the option. The choice lists
consisted of 20 prices ranging from (y + z) euros to x euros in increments of
z = x−y
20
euros. The computer program enforced monotonicity. If a subject
indicated for some price that he did not want to sell then the computer
automatically selected ’I don’t sell for all prices that were lower. Similarly, if
a subject indicated for some price that he wanted to sell then the computer
automatically selected ’I sell for all prices that were higher. We included two
questions to test whether subjects understood the principle of monotonicity
and agreed with it. All did.
The 20 choices were divided into four groups (see Table 2.1). Group 1
consisted of six choices to measure utility. The questions in groups 2, 3,
and 4 measured the eﬀect of more information on ambiguity attitudes. For
groups 3 and 4, we repeated one measurement to test the reliability of our
measurements.
The utility questions (group 1) always came ﬁrst. We counterbalanced
the order in which the three information conditions appeared to avoid that a
better understanding of the task confounded the eﬀect of more information.
We had to use diﬀerent stocks in each group. If we had used options on
the same underlying stock, then subjects who had, for instance, received
information on the stocks performance in the ﬁrst month would have used
this information in the no information and in the one week conditions. We
also randomized the order of the options within each group.
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2.4.3 Incentives
We used a random incentive system. At the end of the experiment, subjects
threw a twenty-sided die twice. The ﬁrst throw selected the choice list and
the second throw selected the line of that list to be played out for real. In the
selected line, we implemented the choice that the subject had made during
the experiment. So if the subject had chosen to sell, we paid him the price.
If he had chosen not to sell, we played out the option xEy and he received x
euros if event E had occurred on the 21st trading day and y euros otherwise.
2.4.4 Analysis
To measure utility, we selected history h0 and elicited the certainty equiva-
lents CEk of the six binary acts xkUpyk where k = 1, . . . , 6, the ﬁrst entries
of Table 2.1. By binary RDU:
U(CEk) = W0(Up)U(xk) + (1−W0(Up))U(yk)5 (2.7)
We assumed a power utility function, i.e.,
U(x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
xβ if β > 0
ln x if β = 0
−xβ if β < 0
The power family is widely used in decision theory and generally ﬁts the data
well (Stott 2006). Dividing all money amounts by the maximum payoﬀ 20
euros scales the power utility function such that U(20) = 1 and U(0) = 0.
We used nonlinear least squares to estimate W0(Up) and β in (2.7). We
then substituted β in Eqs. (2.4) and (2.5) to derive at and bt and the sub-
jective probabilities.
5Under subjective expected utility, W0(Up) = P0(Up).
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As a robustness check we also estimated the parameters β, at, bt and Pt
using a non-linear random coeﬃcient model with individual Fechner errors.
Rather than estimating parameters for each individual, the random coeﬃ-
cient model estimates the means and standard deviations of the distributions
of individual parameters in the population. The parameters at, bt and Pt in
the one week and one month conditions were deﬁned as the sum of the ran-
dom coeﬃcients at history h0 and a history speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect. Details of
the estimation are in Appendix 2.C.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Consistency
The consistency of our measurements was good. In both tests, we observed
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the original and the repeated ask prices
and their correlations were substantial (Spearman correlation 0.86 and 0.81,
both p < 0.01). The mean absolute diﬀerences between the ask prices were
1.09 and 1.00 in the two questions, which gives an indication of the average
error subjects made.
A comparison between the ask prices of the option 20Up0 for stocks 1
and 2 (see Table 2.1) gives further information about the quality of the
data. In both questions, subjects had no information about the underlying
stock and it seems plausible that they treated them similarly. We indeed
found no diﬀerences between the elicited ask prices and their correlation was
substantial (Spearman correlation 0.52, p < 0.01), although lower than in
the other consistency tests. The mean absolute diﬀerence was equal to 1.53.
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2.5.2 Subjective Expected Utility
Appendix 2.A shows the median ask prices under the three informational
conditions. Under expected utility, the subjective probabilities of the events
are
(
CEj
20
)β
. Overall, there was little utility curvature both at the aggregate
and at the individual level, which is consistent with the hypothesis that utility
is about linear for small stakes (Wakker 2010). The median power coeﬃcient
was equal to 1 (interquartile range = [0.83,1.28]) and the number of subjects
with concave utility (33) did not diﬀer from the number of subjects with
convex utility (31).
If expected utility holds then the estimated subjective probabilities
(
CEj
20
)β
should satisfy complementarity and binary additivity. Panel A of Figure 2.4
shows support for complementarity. We could not reject the hypothesis that
P (MiddleUp) + P (Down) = 100%
for all three information conditions. Moreover, we could not reject the hy-
pothesis that the proportion of subjects for whom the sum P (MiddleUp) +
P (Down) exceeded 100% and the proportion for whom this sum was less
than 100% were the same.
Panel B shows that binary additivity could be rejected and, consequently,
that subjective expected utility did not hold. In all three conditions, the sum
of P (Up) and P (Middle) exceeded P (MiddleUp) suggesting binary subadi-
tivity instead of binary additivity (Wilcoxon tests, all p < 0.01). The diﬀer-
ence was signiﬁcant for all three conditions (p < 0.01 in all three tests). There
was no diﬀerence between the three conditions (p = 0.13). At the individ-
ual level, we also observed evidence of binary subadditivity: the proportion
of subjects who behaved according to binary subadditivity was signiﬁcantly
higher than the proportion of subjects displaying binary superadditivity (bi-
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(a) Complementarity
(b) Binary Additivity
Figure 2.4: Tests of complementarity and binary additivity under subjective
expected utility. The numbers show the median values. Panel A shows that
complementarity held approximately. Panel B shows that binary additivity was
violated.
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nomial test p < 0.01 for all three conditions).
The joint ﬁndings of complementarity and binary subadditivity are in
line with previous evidence (Tversky and Koehler 1994, Fox and Tversky
1998, Kilka and Weber 2001, Baillon and Bleichrodt forthcoming). They are
consistent with support theory, a psychological theory of the formation of
subjective probabilities (Tversky and Koehler 1994).
2.5.3 Neo-additive model
Because expected utility was violated, we used Eqs. (2.5) and (2.6) to cor-
rect subjective probabilities for ambiguity aversion and to obtain likelihood
insensitivity and pessimism indices. Subjects whose (corrected) subjective
probabilities were outside the unit interval deviated from the neo-additive
model and had to be excluded from the individual analyses. Because these
deviations might just reﬂect error, we included these subjects in the robust-
ness analysis reported in Section 2.5.4.
We only excluded subjects for the information condition for which they
violated the neo-additive model, but not for the other conditions. This left
56 subjects in the no information condition, 55 subjects in the one week
condition, and 52 subjects in the one month condition. To test for robustness
and to exclude the possibility of selection bias, we also analyzed the data
excluding all subjects who violated the neo-additive model at least once.
The results were similar.
Likelihood Insensitivity
Figure 2.5A shows the likelihood insensitivity indices (at) for the three
conditions. All indices diﬀered from zero suggesting signiﬁcant likelihood
insensitivity (Wilcoxon tests, all p, 0.01). Likelihood insensitivity diminished
with more information: the median value of at fell from 0.34 in the no infor-
2.5 Results 33
(a) Likelihood Insensitivity
(b) Pessimism
Figure 2.5: The likelihood insensitivity and pessimism indices. Panels A and
B show the medians of the likelihood insensitivity and pessimism indices for the
three information conditions. Likelihood insensitivity falls with more information,
but information has no eﬀect on the pessimism indices.
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mation condition to 0.22 in the one month condition. Likelihood insensitivity
for one month was smaller than for one week (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.03), the
other indices did not diﬀer.
Figure 2.6: The relations between the individual likelihood insensitivity indices
(at). If subjects converge to expected utility then the points should lie in the
shaded areas. This happens in all panels.
Figure 2.6 displays the individual values of the likelihood insensitivity
(LIS) indices for the three information conditions. In each of the panels, the
horizontal axis shows the condition in which less information was available.
Points on the diagonal represent subjects with the same likelihood insen-
sitivity for the information conditions depicted. If likelihood insensitivity
diminished with the amount of information, then the data points should be
located below the diagonal.
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Figure 2.6 shows that a few subjects had negative likelihood insensitivity
indices and were too sensitive to likelihood information. For these subjects,
oversensitivity tended to decrease with information. The shaded areas of
Figure 2.6 show the subjects who moved in the direction of ’correct sen-
sitivity to likelihood, i.e. to expected utility. The likelihood insensitivity
or oversensitity of these subjects decreased but they did not overshoot and
went from insensitivity to even larger oversensitivity or from oversensitivity
to even larger insensitivity. In all panels, a majority of points (Binomial tests,
p, 0.01 in all cases) is in the shaded area, which is consistent with convergence
towards expected utility with more information.
Pessimism
Figure 2.5B shows the median of the pessimism indices (bt) for the three
information conditions. We could not reject the null of no pessimism in any
of the information conditions as none of the pessimism indices diﬀered from
zero. There was more optimism in the one week than in the no information
condition (Wilcoxon test, p=0.01), the other diﬀerences were insigniﬁcant.
Figure 2.7 plots the individual pessimism indices for the three information
conditions with the condition with less information on the horizontal axis.
Points on the diagonal represent individuals with the same pessimism in
two information conditions. If pessimism decreases with information then
individual points should be in the lower halves of the ﬁgures. This was the
case for a majority of subjects in Panel A (Binomial test, p = 0.02), but not
in the other two panels. The shaded areas show the subjects who moved
in the direction of expected utility as more information became available.
We only observed a signiﬁcant move to expected utility in the comparison
between the one month and the one week conditions (Panel C, Binomial test,
p = 0.01). However, in interpreting these results it should be kept in mind
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that most subjects displayed little pessimism in all information conditions.
Figure 2.7: The relations between the individual pessimism indices bt. If subjects
converge to expected utility then the points should lie in the shaded areas. This
happens in Panel C.
Figure 2.7 suggests that pessimism was a stable trait as the individual
data points were clustered around the diagonal. The correlations between
the pessimism indices were substantial. The Spearman correlation was 0.76
between the no information and the one week conditions, 0.57 between the no
information and one month conditions, and 0.72 between the one week and
the one month conditions. They were higher than the correlations between
the likelihood insensitivity indices, which varied between 0.19 (no information
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and one month) and 0.54 (no information and one week). We conclude that
likelihood insensitivity was less stable than pessimism and that it was aﬀected
more by information.
2.5.4 Robustness analysis
Table 2.2 summarizes the results of the non-linear random coeﬃcient model.
For each parameter of the neo-additive model 1 (Eqn 2.3) and the multi-
ple priors model (Eqn 2.4), we report the estimate of the mean and of the
standard deviation. For the likelihood insensitivity and pessimism parame-
ters and the subjective probabilities, we also estimated a ﬁxed eﬀect for the
one week and one month conditions. In this estimation, we could include
all elicited certainty equivalents, including repeated measurements and the
responses of subjects who have violated the neo-additive model.
Table 2.2: Random Coeﬃcients Model
model 1 model 2
Neo-Add α-maxmin
LIS
a0 0.52*** 0.51***
[0.04] [0.04]
1w fxd Eﬀ -0.16** -0.15***
[0.05] [0.05]
1m fxd Eﬀ -0.30*** -0.33***
[0.05] [0.05]
σ Rand Eﬀ 0.16*** 0.19***
[0.02] [0.02]
Table continued on the next page.
38 Chapter2. The Eﬀect of Learning on Ambiguity Attitudes
PESM
b0 0.04
[0.04]
1w fxd Eﬀ -0.07***
[0.02]
1m fxd Eﬀ -0.05**
[0.02]
σ Rand Eﬀ 0.07***
[0.01]
ALPHA
α0 0.61***
[0.01]
1w fxd Eﬀ -0.05**
[0.02]
1m fxd Eﬀ 0.07**
[0.05]
σ Rand Eﬀ 0.00
[0.01]
P (Up)
pup0 0.41*** 0.42***
[0.02] [0.01]
1w fxd Eﬀ -0.08*** -0.07***
[0.05] [0.05]
1m fxd Eﬀ -0.07*** -0.08**
[0.05] [0.05]
σ Rand Eﬀ 0.07*** 0.07***
[0.01] [0.01]
Table continued on the next page.
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P (Middle)
pmid0 0.30*** 0.30***
[0.02] [0.02]
1w fxd Eﬀ 0.004*** 0.001***
[0.02] [0.02]
1m fxd Eﬀ 0.05*** 0.06***
[0.02] [0.02]
σ Rand Eﬀ 0.13*** 0.12***
[0.01] [0.01]
Utility β 1.07 1.15***
[0.06] [0.02]
σ Rand Eﬀ 0.20*** 0.26***
[0.02] [0.02]
Noise μ -2.33*** -2.39***
(Fechner Error) [0.05] [0.05]
σ Rand Eﬀ 0.55*** 0.59***
[0.04] [0.04]
Log-Likelihood 844.32 852.71
N 1280 1280
Table 2.2: Random Coeﬃcients Model. Standard errors in square parenthe-
ses. ***: signiﬁcant at 1%, **: signiﬁcant at 5%, *: signiﬁcant at 10%.
Neo-additive Model
The results of the random coeﬃcients model conﬁrmed most of our con-
clusions. There was signiﬁcant likelihood insensitivity in all information
conditions, but no pessimism. Likelihood insensitivity diminished as more
information became available, suggesting that subjects converged towards
expected utility. Our subjects were slightly more optimistic in the one week
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and one month conditions than in the no information condition. This is
consistent with the literature on sources of uncertainty, showing that feeling
more knowledgeable reduces ambiguity aversion.
The Multiple Priors Interpretation
Figure 2.8 shows the interpretations of our results in the multiple priors
setting. An often-raised objection against these models is that the set of
priors is unobservable. Figure 2.8 shows that our method can estimate the
set of priors. The black dot shows the estimated subjective probabilities Pt.
Together with at these determine the set of priors (the light grey area). As
the Figure shows, the set of priors decreases with more information and is
smallest in the one month condition.
The last column of Table 2.2 shows that the maximum likelihood estimate
for α0 was signiﬁcantly greater than 0.50 in the no information condition,
consistent with ambiguity aversion. The pessimism index αt decreased in the
one week condition but increased in the one month condition. The ﬁnding
of signiﬁcant ambiguity aversion in the no information condition is diﬀerent
from what we observed in the neo-additive model. The diﬀerence illustrates
that αt and bt are diﬀerent measures of pessimism.
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Figure 2.8: Sets of priors for the three information conditions (No info, 1 w and
1 m respectively) based on the estimates of Model 2. In each panel, the large
triangle is the simplex representing all possible probability measures over the 3
events Up, Down and Middle. Each vertex of the simplex denotes an event and
corresponds to the measure in which this event is certain. Each opposite side of a
vertex represents the probability measures assigning zero probability to the vertex
event. The grey triangle is the set of priors and the black dot represents Pt.
Subjective Probabilities
Table 2.2 also shows that P (Up) and P (Down), subjects’ subjective prob-
abilities about the events Up and Down, tended to decrease as more informa-
tion became available, whereas P (Middle) increased.6 The elicited probabil-
ities were well-calibrated and close to the true frequencies. For each day from
their introduction to the 21st trading day we computed the proportions of
the 328 IPOs that went up by more than 0.5% (corresponding with the event
Up), the proportions that varied by at most 0.5% (corresponding with the
event Middle), and those that went down by more than 0.5% (corresponding
with the event Down). A frequentist may interpret these proportions as the
6Most diﬀerences are signiﬁcant (p < 0.01) except for the diﬀerences between P (Up)
in the one week and the one month condition, between P (Middle) in the one week and
the no information condition, and between P (Down) in the no information and the one
month condition.
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actual probabilities of the events Up,Middle, and Down at each date t in the
history.
Figure 2.9 shows the results of this analysis. Panel A shows the propor-
tions for the event Up, Panel B for the event Middle, and Panel C for the
event Down. The ﬁgure also shows the estimated probabilities of Up,Middle,
and Down for the three information conditions (the dots at the end of the
line).
Figure 2.9: Stock history and subjective probabilities. Panel A shows the pro-
portion of the 328 IPOs that went up by more than 0.5% on each trading day from
their introduction to the 21st trading day. Panels B and C show the proportions
that varied by at most 0.5% and went down by more than 0.5%, respectively. The
dots at the end show the estimated probabilities of P (Up) (Panel A), P (Middle)
(Panel B), and P (Down) (Panel C) under the three information conditions (in
Panel A the points for one week and one month overlap).
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All subjective probabilities converged to the actual frequencies in the
market. Subjects initially overestimated the probability of the eventUp. As
more information became available, they adjusted their estimate downwards.
On the other hand, subjects underestimated the probability of the event
Middle. This underestimation decreased with information, particularly in
the one month condition. Subjects were close to the true frequency of the
event Down in the no information condition, but then adjusted their estimate
upwards in the one week condition, probably because most stocks did not do
well in their ﬁrst ﬁve trading days and their returns were highly volatile. In
the one month condition, subjects were, again, close to the true frequency.
2.6 Discussion
This paper has studied the eﬀect of learning more information on ambiguity
attitudes using a simple method to correct subjective probabilities for likeli-
hood insensitivity and pessimism. The results indicate that there was signiﬁ-
cant likelihood insensitivity in all information conditions even though we used
experienced subjects. Likelihood insensitivity decreased as more information
became available and the value of the likelihood insensitivity index fell in the
maximum information condition. Subjects went in the direction of correct
sensitivity to likelihood information, i.e. they moved towards expected util-
ity. Likelihood insensitivity is often seen as a cognitive bias (Wakker 2010,
ch. 7). Our ﬁndings suggest that this cognitive bias is reduced with more
information.
We found little evidence of pessimism and information had no eﬀect on
pessimism. Moreover, the correlations between the pessimism indices were
44 Chapter2. The Eﬀect of Learning on Ambiguity Attitudes
high for the three information conditions. This suggests that pessimism is
a stable trait of decision makers preferences and is consistent with the sug-
gestion that pessimism reﬂects the motivational part of ambiguity attitudes
(Wakker 2010, ch. 7). If pessimism is motivational, then more information
should not change this inclination.
The ﬁnding of little pessimism may be surprising given that most empir-
ical studies have found more pessimism than we did (Trautmann and Van
de Kuilen forthcoming). It should be kept in mind that the subjects in our
experiment were ﬁnance students who were familiar with stocks and options.
Empirical evidence suggests that ambiguity aversion decreases when subjects
feel competent about the source of uncertainty (Heath and Tversky 1991) and
this may have explained why we found little evidence of pessimism.
Another reason for the low amount of pessimism might be the use of ask
prices in the elicitation of the certainty equivalents. Ask prices can lead to
endowment eﬀects (Kahneman et al. 1990) and, consequently, to an overes-
timation of certainty equivalents. This would lead to more optimism (Roca
et al. 2006, Trautmann et al. 2011). On the other hand, the eﬀect of endow-
ment eﬀects was the same for the three information conditions and, hence,
they could not aﬀect our conclusions about the eﬀect of more information on
ambiguity attitudes and subjective probabilities.
The joint ﬁndings of close-to-zero pessimism and of diminishing likelihood
insensitivity as more information became available imply that subjects moved
in the direction of expected utility with more information. This agrees with
previous ﬁndings that experience and learning reduce biases. On the other
hand, the likelihood insensitivity index diﬀered signiﬁcantly from zero even
in the one month condition. Moreover, under expected utility, the subjective
probabilities violated binary additivity in all information conditions. We
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conclude that even though more information led to behavior that was more
consistent with expected utility, substantial deviations remained.
We made several assumptions in our analysis. First, we assumed that
utility did not depend on the information about past events. The utility
function reﬂects preferences over outcomes and more information about the
state space has no relevance for these. As we mentioned, this assumption
is common in the literature. Abdellaoui et al. (2011) measured utility for
diﬀerent sources of uncertainty and could not reject the null hypothesis that
utility was the same across sources.
A more controversial assumption is that probabilistic sophistication held
within histories and, hence, that subjective probabilities existed. Diﬀerent
histories can be interpreted as diﬀerent sources of uncertainty. The notion
of sources of uncertainty was ﬁrst proposed by Amos Tversky in the 1990s
(Tversky and Kahneman 1992, Tversky and Fox 1995, Tversky and Wakker
1995). Chew and Sagi (2006, 2008) showed that, if an exchangeability condi-
tion holds, subjective probabilities can be deﬁned within sources even when
probabilistic sophistication does not hold between sources. Our analysis im-
plicitly assumed this exchangeability condition. Abdellaoui et al. (2011)
obtained support for it in all but one of their tests. The only exception was
a test involving an unfamiliar source and hypothetical choice. For real incen-
tives, exchangeability always held. Their real incentive system was similar
to the one we used. Moreover, because our subjects were ﬁnance students,
all sources were familiar. Finally, the estimated subjective probabilities were
well-calibrated: they were sensitive to more information and they were close
to the true frequencies observed in the market. Hence, we are inclined to be-
lieve that probabilistic sophistication within histories ﬁtted the preferences
of most of our subjects rather well. On the other hand, for a minority of our
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subjects the estimates did not converge and we found subjective probabilities
outside the unit interval, which indicates a poor ﬁt.
We ﬁnally assumed that the weighting function could be described by the
neo-additive form. This assumption is not very restrictive as the neo-additive
weighting function provides a good approximation to more general weighting
functions (Diecidue et al. 2009, Abdellaoui et al. 2010). For most subjects
the estimated model parameters were plausible and within the range allowed
by the model.
2.7 Conclusion
Ambiguity theories are useful for studying the eﬀects of information on deci-
sion under ambiguity. Learning new information aﬀects both beliefs and am-
biguity attitudes. We have presented a method to separate subjective prob-
abilities from ambiguity attitudes and ambiguity perception. Our method
decomposes ambiguity attitudes into likelihood insensitivity and pessimism.
We applied our method in an experiment in which we measured the ask prices
of options with payoﬀs depending on the performance of IPOs. The exper-
iment involved three information conditions about historical performance
data. The results indicated that there was signiﬁcant likelihood insensitivity
in all three information conditions, but that likelihood insensitivity dimin-
ished as more information about the historical performance of the stocks
became available. We found little evidence of pessimism and it was not
aﬀected by new information. The estimated subjective probabilities, when
corrected for ambiguity attitudes, converged to true frequencies. Subjects
moved in the direction of subjective expected utility as more information
was provided, but substantial deviations remained even in the maximum
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information condition.
Expected utility is still widely seen as the normative standard for deci-
sion under uncertainty. However, it is also well known that people deviate
from expected utility and our ﬁndings add to the extensive literature on
violations of expected utility. The discrepancy between the normative and
descriptive status of expected utility makes it desirable to adjust preference
measurements for deviations from expected utility. There is a large litera-
ture in decision analysis on correcting utility measurements for deviations
from expected utility (McCord and de Neufville 1986, Wakker and Deneﬀe
1996, Delqui 1997, Bleichrodt et al. 2001). Our paper complements this
literature by showing how the measurement of subjective probabilities can
be corrected for deviations from expected utility. We hope that providing a
method to measure (corrected) subjective probabilities and ambiguity atti-
tudes will stimulate the adoption of ambiguity theories in decision analysis
practice.
2.8 Appendices
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Appendix 2.A: Median Ask Prices
Option Up Middle Down MiddleUp
No Info. 8.50 7.50 7.50 12
1 week 8.50 7.50 8.50 12.50
1 month 7.50 8 7.50 12.50
Appendix 2.B: Experimental Instructions
Instructions Thank you for participating in our experiment. For your par-
ticipation, you will receive a show up fee of 5 euros and an extra payment de-
pending on your choices during the experiment. Please read the instructions
carefully. Before starting the experiment, we will ask you several questions
to test your understanding of the instructions. If you answer every question
correctly, you will proceed to the experiment; otherwise, we will ask you to
read the instructions once more and re-answer the questions until all your
answers are correct. We want to be sure that you have understood the in-
structions so that your answers in the experiment reﬂect your preferences
and are not caused by any misunderstandings. If you have any questions,
please feel free to ask the experimenter.
During the experiment, you have to answer a series of choice questions.
There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. We are interested
in your preferences. Your ﬁnal payment will be determined by the choices
you make during the experiment. Hence it is in your own interest to reveal
your true preferences in the choices you will face.
During the experiment, you will be asked to choose between a digital
option for an underlying stock and a sure money amount. A digital option
for an underlying stock pays a pre-speciﬁed money amountH if a given event
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occurs and L otherwise.
The underlying stock is randomly chosen from a database of stocks that
were newly-listed on the NYSE between 1 January 2009 and 25 February
2011. The stocks in the database are randomly numbered from 1 to 328.
At the beginning of the experiment, you will draw 4 numbers from a box,
and the 4 corresponding stocks will be used as the underlying stocks of your
digital options. At the end of the experiment, the names of the stocks will be
revealed, and you can check the historical quotes of the stock prices on Yahoo
Finance afterwards. Note that we cannot manipulate the price distribution
of the stocks as these are historically given.
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You will face 3 diﬀerent situations.
Situation 1: You have an option for an underlying stock, which has just
been listed on the Stock Exchange. Consequently, you have no quotes of the
historical stock price. You know that the expiration date of the option is the
21st trading day of the stock, and the payoﬀ of the option depends on the
daily return of the stock on the 21st trading day. (More explanation about
the option payoﬀ will be presented later.)
2.8 Appendices 51
Situation 2: You have an option for an underlying stock, which has
been listed on the Stock Exchange for one week. You have 5 quotes of the
historical daily return of the stock, which have been depicted by the brown
bars. You know that the expiration date of the option is the (same) 21st
trading day of the stock, and the payoﬀ of the option depends on the daily
return of the stock on the 21st trading day.
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Situation 3: You have an option of an underlying stock, which has been
listed on the Stock Exchange for 20 days. You have 20 quotes of the historical
daily return of the stock, which have been depicted by the brown bars. You
know that the expiration date of the option is the (same) 21st trading day
of the stock, and the payoﬀ of the option depends on the daily return of the
stock on the 21st trading day.
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You will face 4 types of digital options.
For each situation described above, you may face 4 types of digital op-
tions. Here, we use the ﬁrst situation as an example to illustrate the 4 types
of digital options.
Up-Option
Middle-Option
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Down-Option
MiddleUp-Option
An Up-option pays H euros if the daily return (r) of the underlying stock
on its expiration day exceeds +0.5% (r > +0.5%) and L euros otherwise.
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AMiddle-option pays H euros if the daily return (r) of the underlying stock
on its expiration day varied between -0.5% and +0.5% (−0.5% ≤ r ≤ +0.5%)
and L euros otherwise.
A Down-option pays H euros if the daily return (r) of the underlying stock
on its expiration day is less than -0.5% (r < +0.5%) and L euros otherwise.
A MiddleUp-option pays H euros if the daily return (r) of the underlying
stock on its expiration day exceeds -0.5% (r > −0.5%) and L euros otherwise.
H and L are pre-speciﬁed money amounts. For instance, the ﬁgure above
displays an Up-option with H=15 and L=10, and the other three types with
H=20 and L=0. You may encounter diﬀerent H and L in the experiment.
We will determine your selling price of 20 diﬀerent options through a series
of choices between the option and a certain money amount. An example is
given in the above ﬁgure. For each of the 20 prices, you are asked to indicate
whether you would like to sell the option or not. The money amount where
you switch your choice from I don’t sell to I sell is taken as your selling price.
All sales will be realized on the 21st day.
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If you sell at x euros, do you agree that you also want to sell at prices higher
than x euros? Y/N
If you don’t sell at y euros, do you agree that you don’t want to sell at prices
lower than y? Y/N
Payment
As an example, imagine that you throw 7 on your ﬁrst throw and 6 on
your second. Hence the 7th choice will be selected and the price you are
oﬀered for the option in the 7th choice is 6 euros. Suppose that option in the
7th choice is a MiddleUp-option with H=20 and L=0, as in the ﬁgure above.
Suppose further that your selling price for the 7th option was found to be 9
euros. This means that you are not willing to sell the option for a price less
than 9 euros and, hence, you do not accept the oﬀered price of 6 euros and
thus you keep the option;
If the daily return on the 21st trading day of the underlying stock is at
least −0.5% (e.g. 0.15%), then we pay you 20 euros plus the 5 euros show-up
fee. In total you get 25 euros.
If the daily return on the 21st trading day of the underlying stock is
smaller than −0.5% (e.g. −1.49%), then we pay you e0 plus the 5 euros
show-up fee. In total you get 5 euros.
Now imagine you throw 7 and 10. Then the price oﬀer you are oﬀered is
10 euros. Because you are willing to sell the option if the price is at least 9
euros, you accept the oﬀered price of 10 euros and thus we pay you 10 euros
plus the 5 euros show-up fee. In total you get 15 euros.
Note that it is in your best interests to state your selling price truthfully.
To see that, suppose your true selling price is 9 euros, but you state a selling
price of 11 euros. Then if the price we oﬀer for the option is 10 euros, you
keep the option even though it is worth less to you than 10 euros.
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Questions
Suppose you are going to play the choice in the picture above for real.
1. What is the minimum selling price?
2. What is the payoﬀ of the plotted option, if the daily return on the 21st
trading day is:
(a) 1.4%
(b) −0.45%
(c) −1.4%
3. Suppose that the daily return on the 21st trading day is 1.4%, what is
the total payment you get if the second number you throw is 1?
4. Suppose the daily return on the 21st trading day is 1.4%, what is the
total payment you get if the second number you throw is 15?
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Appendix 2.C: Details of the Random Coeﬃ-
cient Model Estimation
Let CEit(xEjy) denote subject i’s certainty equivalent of option j with his-
tory ht, where Ej ∈ {Up,Middle,Down,MiddleUp} and t ∈ {0, 1w, 1m}.
To account for errors in subjects reported certainty equivalents, we add a
stochastic term ijt to the certainty equivalent predicted by Equation (2.1)
with power utility,
CEit(xEjy =
(
Wit(Ej)x
βi +
(
1−Wit(Ej)
)
yβi
)1/βi
(2.8)
The individual parameter βi is normally distributed with mean β, and vari-
ance σ2β. The history dependent individual weighting function Wit is de-
ﬁned according to Equation (2.2) and depends on the parameter vector
ηit = {ait, bit, pupit, pmidit} and pupit = Pit(Up), pmidit = Pit(Middle). The
certainty equivalent predicted by Equation (2.1) with utility parameter βi
and the weighting function parameters ηit is denoted by ĈEit(xEjy).
We assume that ηi0 follows a multivariate normal distribution with mean
η0 and diagonal variance-covariance matrix σ
2
η0
. For t ∈ {0, 1w, 1m}, let
ηt = ηit − ηi0. The error term ijt is assumed to follow a normal distribu-
tion with mean 0 and standard deviation σi, where σi follows a lognormal
distribution with parameters μ and σ
2
 .
Let ξi = (βi, ai0, bi0, pupi0, pmidi0, σi) be the vector of individual speciﬁc
random parameters, which are assumed to be independent of each other. Let
f denote the density function of ξ and let θ = (β, η0,η1w, η1m, μ, σβ, ση0 , σ)
denote the vector of model parameters. For a given θ, the contribution to
the likelihood for subject i is therefore:
ιi(θ) =
∫
R6
[∏
j,t
1
σi
φ
(
CEit(xEjy)− ĈEit(xEjy)
σi
)]
f(ξ|θ)dξ, (2.9)
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where φ is the standard normal density function. The log-likelihood is given
by the sum of the logarithm of ιi for all subjects. To approximate the mul-
tiple integral in Eq. (2.9), we used simulation techniques, where Halton
sequences of length 500 were drawn for each individual (Train 2009, ch. 9).
We maximized the log-likelihood function with respect to the vector of model
parameters θ using the ’fminunc function in Matlab.
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Abstract
Informational (statistical) independence is an important tool in
probability assessments. We extend this concept to decision theory.
We use it as a primitive in preference foundations and investigate its
implications in modern non-Bayesian ambiguity theories. Symmetry
of informational independence is enough to provide a new foundation
of Bayesian expected utility. Nonsymmetric versions can be reconciled
with ambiguity models, where they give useful implications. They
generate a separability paradox for the popular Anscombe-Aumann
framework for analyzing ambiguity. The two stages of that framework
can better be reversed, as in Jaﬀray’s framework.
Keywords: statistical independence, preference foundation, expected
utility, ambiguity, Anscombe-Aumann model
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3.1 Introduction
Statistical independence of an event from another (conditioning) event means
that the latter is not informative about the former. In probability theory,
it means that the probability of the former event is not impacted by con-
ditioning on the latter event. This concept of informational independence
is commonly used as a primitive in probability assessments (Smith & von
Winterfeldt 2004, p. 565), Bayesian networks (Halpern 2003 Ch. 4; Jensen
& Nielsen 2013; Pearl 2000; Williamson 2005), and causal decision theory
(Glynn 2011; Harper, Chow, & Murray 2012; Tversky & Kahneman 1980).
It appeals to a basic intuition in people.
This paper extends informational independence, or independence for short,
into decision theory. Independence requires that a conditioning event not
provide relevant information for some other (essential) event and, hence, the
conditioning event does not impact preferences on payments contingent on
the essential event. As a ﬁrst topic, we study which decision models can
accommodate (informational) independence, and then use it to axiomatize
some models. Remarkably, symmetry of independence is enough to imply
Bayesian expected utility. Without symmetry, independence can be used
in some ambiguity (unknown probability) models that generalize Bayesian
expected utility.
The Bayesian statisticians Bernardo, Ferrandiz, & Smith (1985) ﬁrst in-
troduced statistical independence as a primitive in decision theory. They only
considered Bayesian expected utility, and assumed a rich structure compris-
ing both Savage’s (1954) and Anscombe-Aumann’s (1963) (AA) framework.
We simplify and generalize their derivation of expected utility, and extend
the analysis to ambiguity models.
Independence is implicitly used in the AA framework, which is nowadays
70
Chapter3. Statistical Independence for Axiomatizing Bayesian Expected
Utility and Non-Bayesian Ambiguity
the most popular framework for analyzing ambiguity. In this framework, so-
called roulette events (known probabilities) are assumed independent of so-
called horse events (ambiguous). We show that this independence assumption
leads to a separability paradox. We hence recommend a reversal of stages in
the AA framework, as in Jaﬀray’s models.
3.2 Notation, deﬁnitions, and well-known rep-
resentations
We only consider two complementary events E1 and E2, and two other com-
plementary events Ca and Cb. Of each pair, exactly one is true and the other
is not. For each pair, it is uncertain which event is the true one. The exten-
sion of our results to general independent partitions with n events E1, . . . , En
and m events C1, . . . , Cm, or inﬁnitely many events, is straightforward. This
paper does not seek mathematical generality and aims to keep technical de-
tails to a minimum, so as to make the conceptual issues maximally clear.
We therefore focus on two binary partitions. We call E1 and E2 essential .
In most examples, these events will determine the outcomes. Ca and Cb are
conditioning events . In most examples, they serve to provide information
about E1 and E2.
In the AA framework, deﬁned later, Ca (say an American horse) and Cb
(say a Belgian horse) refer to two horses, one of which will win the next race,
and E1 and E2 refer to two roulette events (say odd and even).
1
1Which of these events are best suited to play the role of essential or conditioning
event will be a central point of debate in what follows. We will assume later that odd and
even have 0.5 probabilities in the roulette example. In the regular roulette game, these
probabilities may be slightly diﬀerent, e.g., because of the 0 number.
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The above events generate a state space S through their intersections in
the usual way: S = {E1Ca, E1Cb, E2Ca, E2Cb}. All subsets of S are called
events .
x = (x1a, x1b, x2a, x2b) refers to a prospect yielding outcomes x1a if E1 and
Ca occur, with the other outcomes deﬁned similarly. Outcomes are monetary.
The prospect is displayed in Eq. 3.1.
x =
Ca Cb
E1 x1a x1b
E2 x2a x2b
(3.1)
The set of prospects is isomorphic to R4. We often use Greek letters α, β, γ, δ
to designate outcomes. Then (α1a, β1b, γ2a, δ2b) denotes the obvious prospect.
For example, (α1a, α1b, β2a, β2b) yields α under E1 and β under E2. By  we
denote a preference relation over the prospects, with ,,∼ deﬁned as usual.
We assume weak ordering (completeness: x  y or y  x for all prospects
x, y, and transitivity), monotonicity (any increase of any outcome is strictly
preferred), and continuity throughout. We summarize the assumptions made
throughout this paper.
Structural Assumption: Prospects (denoted by (x1a, x1b, x2a, x2b)) are
mappings from the state space {E1Ca, E1Cb, E2Ca, E2Cb} to R, the outcome
set.  is a monotonic continuous weak order on R4, the set of prospects.
E1-prospects are prospects whose values depend only on E1 and its com-
plement E2. That is, they are prospects of the form (α1a, α1b, β2a, β2b), also
denoted αE1β, and they yield outcome α under event E1 and β under event
E2. E1-preferences designate the preference relation  restricted to E1-
prospects. Ca-prospects (α1a, β1b, α2a, β2b) are deﬁned similarly.
The following condition entails, informally, that preferences conditional
on Ca are independent of common outcomes (denoted cj below) outside of
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Ca. Event Ca is separable if
Ca Cb
E1 α c1
E2 β c2

Ca Cb
E1 γ c1
E2 δ c2
(3.2)
implies
Ca Cb
E1 α c
′
1
E2 β c
′
2

Ca Cb
E1 γ c
′
1
E2 δ c
′
2
(3.3)
for all outcomes considered.
Separability of any event other than Ca is deﬁned similarly. It again
refers to independence of preferences conditional on that event from the level
at which common outcomes outside that event are kept ﬁxed. Monotonic-
ity implies that all “atomic” events E1Ca, E1Cb, E2Ca, E2Cb are separable.
Separability without qualiﬁcation means that all event are separable. It is
Savage’s (1954) sure-thing principle, being his postulate P2.
A function V evaluates prospects if V : R4 → R and x  y ⇔ V (x) ≥
V (y). Expected utility (EU) holds if there exist probabilities p1a, p2a, p1b, p2b
(positive and summing to 1) and a continuous strictly increasing utility func-
tion U : R → R such that x → ∑j∈{1a,1b,2a,2b} pjU(xj) evaluates prospects.
The probabilities and utilities can be derived from preferences and, hence,
are often called subjective, and so is this EU model.
We will also consider the state-dependent generalization of EU, where U
can depend on events. Then, it is well-known that, without further assump-
tions, utilities and probabilities cannot be separated (Kreps 1988 Eqs. 4.4
and 7.13). We therefore use general functions Vj to generalize the products
pjU . State-dependent expected utility (EU) holds if there exist continuous
strictly increasing additive value functions Vj : R → R, j = 1, . . . , n such
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that x → ∑j∈{1a,1b,2a,2b} Vj(xj) evaluates prospects. An alternative term for
the latter function is additive(ly decomposable) representation. We have (De-
breu 1960):
Theorem 3.1. State-dependent EU holds if and only if separability holds.
The additive value functions are unique up to location (we can add a constant
to each) and a joint unit (we can multiply them all by the same positive
factor).
The theorem shows that separability is not enough to give EU (because
the Vjs need not be proportional). Savage (1954), in a somewhat diﬀerent
set-up, added a likelihood consistency condition (his P4) to obtain EU. Other
authors added other conditions for the same purpose.2
3.3 Independence
The term independence has been used in many diﬀerent meanings in decision
theory. Our term concerns a preference version of statistical independence,
and it can be called informational independence or i-independence. Because
no other concepts of independence appear in this paper, and no confusion
will arise, we use the short term independence throughout.
3.3.1 Independence; general introduction
Independence of an uncertain event E from a conditioning event C means,
informally, that C carries no information about E. In traditional probability
theory, it means that conditioning on C does not aﬀect the probability of E.
2See Abdellaoui & Wakker (2005), Chew & Karni (1994), Gul (1992), Ko¨bberling &
Wakker (2003), Nakamura 1995).
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Independence of E is always equivalent to independence of its complement
Ec, both in traditional theories and in the generalized theories considered in
this paper. In traditional theories, independence is also symmetric in E and
C: If E is independent from C, then so is C from E. This symmetry will
have to be abandoned in generalized theories.
In preference theory, independence means that preferences contingent on
E are unaﬀected by conditioning on C. A particular independence is implic-
itly assumed in the AA framework, where it causes some problems as we will
see later. For obtaining our results, the main mathematical tools are theo-
rems by Gorman (1968), van Daal & Merkies (1988), and Mongin & Pivato
(2015). Our paper shows how these mathematical results, and some other
results in the literature, are related to the concept of statistical independence.
3.3.2 Independence related informally to dynamic up-
dating
Our formal analysis will deﬁne all concepts in terms of static, “present,”
preferences, and we will investigate the implications and restrictions of inde-
pendence for static theories. Independence is often interpreted by referring
to dynamic settings, involving future updating. This subsection, which plays
no role in the formal analysis, explains the relations of such deﬁnitions with
what we do.
In studies on future updating it is typically assumed, for instance, that
the information will be received that Ca is true, ruling out the events E1Cb
and E2Cb. Then preferences are determined, for instance between a condi-
tional prospect (E1Ca : α,E2Ca : β), yielding α under E1Ca and β under
E2Ca, and another conditional prospect (E1Ca : γ, E2Ca : δ). It is then
assumed that the outcomes under E1Cb and E2Cb, counterfactual as they
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are by then, are no more relevant and can be ignored. The latter assump-
tion is a special case of Machina’s (1989) consequentialism (applied only to
E1). For updated preferences to be relevant to present preferences, it is de-
sirable that the mentioned outcomes then also be irrelevant under present
preferences. This assumption is a special case of Machina’s (1989) dynamic
consistency. Separability of the conditioning event Ca follows. Bernardo,
Ferrandiz, & Smith (1985 Deﬁnition 3 and Axiom 3(iii)) similarly deﬁned
conditional preferences, imposing separability.
Separability is a restrictive assumption that has often been discussed.
When imposed on one event, as is done here, the condition is not very re-
strictive. When imposed on all single elements of a partition of the universal
event (e.g., {C1, C2}), as will be done later, the condition still is not very
restrictive. It then becomes what is called weak separability in consumer
theory (Blackorby, Primont & Russell 1978 pp. 42-60), amounting to a kind
of monotonicity, and it can then be accommodated by many nonexpected
utility theories. The condition becomes restrictive, capturing much of ex-
pected utility, only when imposed on overlapping composite events, mainly
by Gorman’s (1968) powerful result (Theorem 8 in the appendix).
Too much of the spirit of statistical independence is lost if separability of
the conditioning event is given up. If the preference in Eq. 3.2 depends on c1
and c2 (so, can be diﬀerent from Eq. 3.3), then there can be no clear relation
between updated preference and present preference. Hence all versions of
independence considered later will imply this separability. We will investigate
to what extent it is possible to still have such independence for static nonEU
theories. Thus, our formal analysis does not consider dynamic aspects.
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3.3.3 Independence deﬁned formally
The following two versions of independence are equivalent under traditional
theories and, therefore, are usually not distinguished. In our general setting,
they can be diﬀerent. The ﬁrst version, also used by Bernardo, Ferrandiz, &
Smith (1985 Deﬁnition 4), considers E1-preferences. E1 is weakly (informa-
tionally) independent of Ca if:
Ca Cb
E1 α α
E2 β β

Ca Cb
E1 γ γ
E2 δ δ
(3.4)
if and only if
Ca Cb
E1 α c1
E2 β c2

Ca Cb
E1 γ c1
E2 δ c2
(3.5)
for all outcomes considered.
The condition implies that for E1-preferences it does not matter whether
or not the information that Ca is true is received. The condition directly
appeals to intuitions of noninformativeness, and can serve well as a primitive
in empirical preference assessments. This paper focuses on theoretical results.
As explained before, the above condition implies separability of Ca. It adds
further restrictions as we will see later.
The second version of independence is stronger. It implies that it does
not matter for E1-preferences whether the received information is that Ca is
true or that Ca is not true. E1 is complement-independent , or independent
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for short, of Ca if:
Ca Cb
E1 α c1
E2 β c2

Ca Cb
E1 γ c1
E2 δ c2
(3.6)
if and only if
Ca Cb
E1 c
′
1 α
E2 c
′
2 β

Ca Cb
E1 c
′
1 γ
E2 c
′
2 δ
(3.7)
for all outcomes considered.
It is always understood in independence conditions that the conditioning
event plays the role of Ca above. Both deﬁnitions are symmetric in E1
and E2. Thus, (weak) independence of E1 from Ca is equivalent to (weak)
independence of E2 from Ca. Independence is also symmetric in Ca and Cb.
As discussed before, neither version of independence needs to be symmetric
in E1 and Ca.
OBSERVATION 3.1: Independence implies weak independence, and
separability of the conditioning event and its complement. Weak indepen-
dence implies separability of the conditioning event.
Example 10 in the appendix shows that weak independence in general is
weaker than independence.
3.4 Independence with separability
This section considers some implications of independence, and the possibil-
ity to have independence outside of EU. The following theorem, which is our
ﬁrst main result, gives a foundation of EU using independence. From the
perspective of using independence outside of EU, this theorem is a negative
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result because it excludes non-EU. However, from a more positive perspec-
tive, giving a foundation of EU entirely in terms of statistical independence
is useful. As it turns out, independence with symmetry implies not only
separability (Savage’s 1954 sure-thing principle), but also Savage’s likelihood
consistency P4, which is the other main condition that Savage used to derive
EU.
Theorem 3.2. 3 The following two statements are equivalent:
1. E1 is independent of Ca and Ca is independent of E1.
2. Expected utility holds. Writing P (E1Ca) = p1a, P (E1) = p1a + p1b, and
P (Ca) = p1a + p2a, we further have P (E1Ca) = P (E1)× P (Ca).4
From a positive perspective on Theorem 3.2, the traditional indepen-
dence conditions, when stated as preference conditions, give not only the
multiplicative form of probabilities, but the whole EU model itself. From a
negative perspective, some of the traditional properties of independence will
have to be abandoned in generalized models. This is the topic of the rest of
this paper.
3Bernardo, Ferrandiz, & Smith (1985) also derived expected utility from independence
but used a rich structure. It did not only comprise Savage’s (1954) state space and axioms,
but also an AA richness through their Axiom 4. They required existence of independent
random events with any objective probability. Mongin & Pivato (2015) also used the the-
orem of aggregation following from Gorman (1968), and then imposed an equal-ordering
condition of conditionals similar to independence. This equal-ordering condition was dis-
cussed by van Daal & Merkies (1988) as homogeneity of individuals (= rows). Mongin
& Pivato (2015) consider a more general mathematical setup with more than four events
and with non-Euclidean outcomes, but do not relate their conditions to statistical inde-
pendence.
4This implies the usual p1b = P (E1) × (1 − P (Ca)), p2a = (1 − P (E1)) × P (Ca), and
p2b = (1− P (E1))× (1− P (Ca)).
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In the rest of this section, we maintain separability, that is, we assume
the state-dependent generalization of EU. A classical problem in this model
is the impossibility of identifying probability and, then, of ﬁnding out what
plausible assumptions can serve to identify probabilities after all (Dre`ze 1987;
Karni 1996, 2013; Kadane & Winkler 1988; Schervish, Seidenfeld, & Kadane,
1990; Nau, 1995). The following theorem provides a new way, showing that
statistical independence delivers probabilities for the conditioning events.
The result can be interpreted as negative in the sense that utility can no
longer depend on that conditioning event. Thus, having probabilities and
generating state dependent utility still does not go together for the same
event.
Theorem 3.3 (Independence and separability). Assume separability. Then
the following three statements are equivalent:
1. E1 is weakly independent of Ca.
2. E1 is independent of Ca.
3. There exists probabilities P (Ca) and P (Cb) = 1−P (Ca), and continuous
strictly increasing functions V1 and V2 such that prospects are evaluated
by
Ca Cb
E1 x1 y1
E2 x2 y2
→ P (Ca)(V1(x1) + V2(x2)) + P (Cb)(V1(y1) + V2(y2)).
(3.8)
Thus, we get an EU representation for Ca-prospects with probabilities
P (Ca) and P (Cb), and a utility function U(α) = V1(α) + V2(α). Apparently,
some space is left for non-EU, but not much, and only for events that can
never play a role as conditioning events.
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3.5 Independence without separability
We now turn to general nonexpected utility models, where there is no sep-
arability other than what is implied by independence. We will provide a
representation theorem for rank-dependent utility (RDU). Implications for
other nonexpected utility models are left as a topic for future research. In
particular, it is an open question to us whether, under general nonexpected
utility, weak independence of E1 from Ca and of Ca from E1, i.e., symmetric
weak independence, is possible, or whether these assumptions are already
enough to imply EU. The latter result would generalize our Theorem 3.2.
We will now see that under RDU at least, symmetric weak independence is
not possible outside of EU.
RDU generalizes EU by using a weighting function W deﬁned on events,
satisfying W (∅) = 0,W (S) = 1, and A ⊃ B ⇒ W (A) ≥ W (B). W is
allowed to be nonadditive. U is again a continuous strictly increasing utility
function. To evaluate a prospect x = (x1a, x1b, x2a, x2b), we ﬁrst rank-order
the outcomes from best to worst. That is, we take ρ : {1, 2, 3, 4} → S such
that xρ(1) ≥ · · · ≥ xρ(4). Then x is evaluated by
RDU(x) =
4∑
j=1
πρ(j)U(xρ(j)) (3.9)
where the πρ(j)s are positive weights adding to 1, deﬁned by
πρ(j) = W ({ρ(1), . . . , ρ(j)})−W ({ρ(1), . . . , ρ(j − 1)}). (3.10)
Here πρ(1) = W ({ρ1}). RDU holds whenever a weighting function W and a
utility function U exist that give the evaluation just described. The following
theorem5 is remarkably similar to Theorem 3.3.
5Sarin & Wakker (1998 Theorem 3.1) derived a conclusion similar to Theorem 3.4
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Theorem 3.4 (Independence and no separability). Assume RDU. Then the
following three statements are equivalent:
1. E1 is weakly independent of Ca.
2. E1 is independent of Ca.
3. There exists probabilities P (Ca) = W (Ca) and P (Cb) = 1 − P (Ca) =
W (Cb), such that prospects are evaluated by
Ca Cb
E1 x1 y1
E2 x2 y2
→ P (Ca)RDU(x1
E1
x2) + P (Cb)RDU(y1
E1
y2). (3.11)
3.6 Implications for the Anscombe-Aumann
framework
In the AA framework there are two kinds of events. First, there are comple-
mentary ambiguous events Ha and Hb called horse events . Say they describe
the winner of an upcoming horse race between two horses, an American and
a Belgian. These events are of most interest to us. Then there are comple-
mentary risky events R1, R2 called roulette events , for which probabilities are
given. They may describe the result of a spin of a roulette wheel. They play
an auxiliary role, serving to clarify the analysis of the ambiguous events.
R1-prospects are evaluated by EU. Ha-prospects αHaβ are evaluated by
an ambiguity functional V (α, β) that can take diﬀerent forms, depending on
(EU in the ﬁrst stage and not in the second) from diﬀerent assumptions. Their main
assumption was sequential consistency, implying that general models, such as RDU, used
to evaluate general prospects, should also be used for evaluating conditional prospects in
subtrees. Independence was implicitly implied by backward induction in their approach.
Theorem 3.4 only assumes the overall model and independence.
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applications and interests. Schmeidler (1989) considered an RDU functional
V , and Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989) considered a maxmin multiple priors
functional V . Many other functionals have been considered (surveyed by
Etner, Jeleva, & Tallon 2012 and Trautmann & Wakker 2015).
General prospects, depending jointly on H and R events, are evaluated
by
Ha Hb
R1 x1 y1
R2 x2 y2
→ V (EU(x1
R1
x2), EU(y1
R1
y2)). (3.12)
Figure 3.1: Diﬀerent orderings of events
That is, we ﬁrst take EU conditional on Ha and Hb, and then apply the
functional V .6 The evaluation is usually justiﬁed by temporal assumptions
(Figure 3.1.a). It is assumed that ﬁrst the uncertainty about the horse race
(event Ha or event Hb) is resolved, and then the roulette wheel is spun (event
R1 or R2). Next backward induction is applied: First the R1-prospects are
6Or we apply V ◦U−1 where U−1 gives certainty equivalents, if V is to be applied to
outcomes.
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replaced by their expected utilities, and then the ambiguity functional is
applied to the resulting Ha-prospect.
The evaluation in Eq. 3.12 is appropriate if R1 and R2 can be taken to
be independent of Ha and Hb. Thus, the ambiguous events Ha and Hb play
the role of conditioning events here. A comparison with Theorems 3.2 and
3.4 suggests problems. These theorems show that events with probabilities
are best suited to play the role of conditioning events. In the AA framework
the opposite happens, and the H events, which have no probabilities, play
the role of conditioning events. Our theorems suggest that it is preferable
to condition on R1 and R2, rather than on Ha and Hb. In other words, the
approach displayed in Fig. 1b seems to be more suited. Theorem 3.4 shows in
particular that in Schmeidler’s (1989) derivation of RDU, the order of stages
assumed in the AA framework is problematic.
Formally, the above claims were proved only for state-dependent EU and
RDU. We next show that the problems of the AA framework hold for gen-
eral ambiguity models, by using Observation 3.1. This observation shows
that the conditioning events—the ambiguous H events in the common AA
framework—should be separable. Although, as explained before, separability
of the elements of a partition, as with {H1, H2} in the AA framework, may
not be very restrictive, its restrictions still are incompatible with ambiguity.
This point is explained by the following paradox. The paradox is a variation
on an informal example by Wakker (2010, Figure 10.7.1), modiﬁed using the
formal concepts of our paper.
Example 3.1: [The separability paradox for the AA framework; see
Figure 3.2]
Assume that R1 and R2 have probability 0.5, and assume indiﬀerence between
CE for sure and 100R10. Thus, CE removes the risk in a preference-neutral
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manner. Under risk aversion, CE ≤ 50. Readers can substitute their own
CE here. The AA framework implies the indiﬀerences in Figures 3.2.a and
3.2.b. R1 and R2 are treated independently of Ha and Hb, as in Equations
3.4 and 3.5: conditioning on Ha does not aﬀect R1-prospects. Events Ha and
Hb must be separable, as in Equation 3.3. However, these implied indiﬀerences
are not plausible. Ambiguity aversion will generate interactions between Ha and
Hb, based on global properties of prospects, as explained next. For ambiguity
averse readers who do not apply the AA framework mechanically, but follow their
intuitive preferences, we predict the following preferences, deviating from the AA
implications.
In Figure 3.2.a, replacing the upper left lottery by its CE removes the risk in
a preference-neutral manner. But it does more: it removes all ambiguity. In
the left prospect, all outcomes are ambiguous. Under both events R1 and R2,
there is ambiguity about the resulting outcome. The decision maker observes
the disappearance of ambiguity due to the CE substitution by comparing what
happens under event Ha with what happens under event Hb, entailing a global
observation of the prospects. Such observations go against the separable eval-
uation of Ha and Hb assumed in the AA framework. The disappearance of not
only risk but also ambiguity generates extra preference for the right prospect in
Figure 3.2.a, which will be strictly preferred to the left prospect.
Figure 3.2: The separability paradox for the Anscombe-Aumann model
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The left prospect in Figure 3.2.b yields a ﬁfty-ﬁfty lottery irrespective of the H
events, and the outcomes have known probabilities (0.5). Hence this prospect is
unambiguous. Neither under R1 nor under R2 is there ambiguity. The CE sub-
stitution in the upper branch does not only remove risk, which by itself happens
in a preference-neutral manner. It has an extra eﬀect: it generates ambiguity. In
the right prospect, all outcomes are ambiguous (exactly as with the left prospect
in Figure 3.2.a). Ambiguity aversion generates negative preference for the right
prospect, leading to a strict preference for the left prospect.
Formally, the indiﬀerence that deﬁnes CE together with a strict preference in
Figure 3.2.a (and similarly with a strict preference in Fig. 2b) implies that R1 is
not weakly independent of Ha, invalidating backwards induction. The reversal of
strict preference from Figure 3.2.a to Figure 3.2.b by itself also directly violates
weak independence.
Ambiguity means almost by deﬁnition that the separability of EU is violated,
with interactions occurring between disjoint events. This was the main lesson
of the Ellsberg paradoxes, where it crucially depends on outcomes under other
events to decide whether a substitution conditional on some events generates or
removes ambiguity. Global inspections of prospects are relevant, as it happens
in our example with the disjoint events Ha and Hb.
The preceding example showed that the separable treatment of the H-
events in the AA framework is inconsistent with their ambiguity. Jaﬀray
(personal communication related to Jaﬀray & Wakker 1993), who considered
EU to be appropriate for risk but not for ambiguity, emphasized that condi-
tioning should be done only with respect to unambiguous events, a principle
satisﬁed in all his ambiguity papers (Jaﬀray 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1990, 1991a,
b, 1994). He thus adopted the framework depicted in Figure 3.1.a rather than
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the one in Figure 3.1.b. It leads to the following evaluation:
Ha Hb
R1 x1 y1
R2 x2 y2
→ P (R1)V ((x1
Ha
y1) + P (R2)V ((x2
Ha
y2), (3.13)
where V can be any ambiguity functional of interest.
Currently, Figure 3.1.a is very popular-to the extent that it is almost
the only used way to model ambiguity-because of its mathematical conve-
nience. For example, Machina (2012), when analyzing mixed bets (prospects)
with both risky and ambiguous events being outcome-relevant, only consid-
ers evaluations using Fig. 1a, even though there is no temporal ordering of
the events.
Figure 3.1.b also provides convenient mathematical tools. The math-
ematics of Eq. 3.13 has been extensively studied in multiattribute utility
theory, where the pairs (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) designate commodity bundles
(multiattribute outcomes). Many kinds of interactions between the x and y
coordinates have been developed and axiomatize, in Keeney & Raiﬀa (1976)
and numerous follow-up papers. Such techniques can be used to capture am-
biguity attitudes. Jaﬀray’s models illustrate this point. Recent papers that
used this approach, and that were inspired by Jaﬀray’s work, include Gul &
Pesendorfer (2014) and Olszewski (2007).
3.7 Conclusion
We have stated preference conditions capturing independence in a statisti-
cal sense, and have examined independence in various decision models. A
symmetry condition, routinely assumed in the traditional Bayesian model,
turns out to imply this Bayesian model. From a positive perspective, this
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symmetry gives a new foundation to the Bayesian model, but from a negative
perspective, this symmetry cannot be used in other models. Nonsymmetric
independencies can be applied to non-Bayesian (ambiguity) models, where we
derive their implications. In particular, these implications reveal a problem
for the Anscombe-Aumann framework, which is very popular in the ambigu-
ity literature today. This problem can be avoided by reversing the order of
stages in this framework.
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Appendix 3.A: Preparations for proofs
As a preparation for the proofs, we present Gorman’s (1968) powerful theo-
rem.
Theorem 3.5 (Gorman’s theorem). Assume that A and B are two separable
events with nontrivial overlap (A ∩ B,A ∩ Bc, and Ac ∩ B are nonempty).
Then A ∩ B, A ∩Bc, Ac ∩B, and all their unions, are also separable.
The following corollary follows from repeated application of Gorman’s
result. It is a special case of a well-known implication of Gorman’s theorem,
sometimes called the theorem of aggregation: If prospects can be represented
in a matrix, as in Eq. 3.1, and all rows and all columns are separable, then
separability holds. This result has a long history (Nataf 1948; reviewed
by Aczl 1997 and van Daal & Merkies 1988). For example, if rows refer to
individuals and columns to production inputs, then under separability of rows
and columns, ﬁrst aggregating over individuals (micro) can be equivalent to
ﬁrst aggregating production inputs (macro).
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Corollary 3.1. Separability holds as soon as three of the four events E1, E2,
Ha, Hb are separable.
Proof. s1 = E1Ha, s2 = E1Hb, s3 = E2Ha, s4 = E2Hb. Assume that {s1, s2},
{s3, s4}, and {s1, s3} are separable. Monotonicity implies separability of all
four sj; this could also be derived from Gorman’s theorem applied to {s1, s2}
and {s1, s3}, and then to {s3, s4} and {s1, s3}. For each newly derived sepa-
rable set below, we indicate the two preceding sets that, through Gorman’s
theorem, imply separability of it.
{s1, s2}, {s2, s3} ⇒ {s1, s2, s3};
{s3, s4}, {s2, s3} ⇒ {s2, s3, s4};
{s1, s2}, {s2, s3, s4} ⇒ {s1, s3, s4};
{s3, s4}, {s1, s2, s3} ⇒ {s1, s2, s4}.
Now that we have all three-element events separable, we can get all two-
element events from intersections of the proper three-element events. Thus,
we have separability of all events.
The following concepts will be used in several proofs. We call μ the (un-
conditional) certainty equivalent (CE ) of the E1-prospect αE1β if μE1μ ∼
αE1β. By continuity and monotonicity, this CE always exists and is unique.
We next consider αE1β conditioned on Ca, with common (or counterfactual)
outcomes c1b, c2b. We call μ the conditional certainty equivalent (CCE ) of
(α, β) under Ca if Ca is separable, and (α1a, c1b, β2a, c2b) ∼ (μ1a, c1b, μ2a, c2b).
By separability of Ca, μ is independent of c1b and c2b and, hence, it is well
deﬁned. By continuity and monotonicity, CCEs again always exist and are
unique. CCEs under Cb, or under other events, are deﬁned analogously.
Because of continuity and monotonicity, CEs of E1-prospects completely de-
termine preferences over these prospects, and CCEs completely determine
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conditional preferences. Independence means that CCEs under Ca and Cb
are the same. Weak independence means that conditional CEs under Ca
agree with unconditional CEs of E1 prospects.
The following example shows that, for general preferences, weak indepen-
dence is weaker than independence.
Example 3.2: Assume that prospects (x1a, x1b, x2a, x2b) are evaluated by
x1a + x2a + x1b + x2b
4
+ f((x1a + x2a)− (x1b + x2b))× g(x1b), (3.14)
where both f and g are 0 on R−, are strictly increasing on R+, have both their
values and derivatives always below 0.25, and are continuous. For example, on
R+, we may take f(α) = g(α) = (1 − exp((α)/4))/4. The preference relation
generated by this evaluation function is, by deﬁnition, transitive and complete.
It is also continuous. The ﬁrst term in Eq. 3.14 is strictly increasing in all four
outcomes with derivatives 0.25, and is also strictly increasing in x1a + x2a with
derivative 0.25. The second term in Eq. 3.14 is nondecreasing in x1a, x2a, and
x1a + x2a. Thus, monotonicity with respect to x1a, x2a, and their sum follows.
The latter monotonicity implies separability of Ca. Although the second term
in Eq. 3.14 may sometimes be decreasing in x1b and x2b, the derivative is never
below −1/8 for x1b and never below −1/4 for x2b, and the ﬁrst term ensures
monotonicity also in x1b and x2b. For all E1-prospects, the second term vanishes,
and E1-prospects are evaluated by expected value, as are preferences with x1b
and x2b kept ﬁxed due to monotonicity in x1a + x1b. Hence weak independence
holds. However, (2, 0, 2, 2) ∼ (0, 2, 2, 2) and (2, 2, 2, 0)  (2, 2, 0, 2) show that
independence is violated.
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Appendix 3.B: Proofs
Proof of Observation 3.1: Independence implies that the preferences
in Eqs. 3.6 and 3.7 are independent of c1, c2, c
′
1 and c
′
2, implying separa-
bility of both Ca and Cb. Independence then implies that the CCE μ of
(α, β) is the same under Ca as under Cb. We then have (α1a, α1b, β2a, β2b) ∼
(μ1a, α1b, μ2a, β2b) ∼ (μ1a, μ1b, μ2a, μ2b). That is, μ, the unconditional CE of
(α1a, α1b, β2a, β2b), is identical to the two conditional CEs mentioned. This
implies weak independence of E1 with respect to both Ca and Cb.
Weak independence implies that the preference in Eq. 3.5 is independent
of c1 and c2, which implies separability of the conditioning event Ca. 
Proof of Theorem 3.2: Statement 1. readily follows from Statement
2. Hence we assume 1, and derive 2. The independence assumptions imply
separability of E1, E2, Ca, Cb. Corollary 3.1 implies separability. Theorem
3.1 implies state-dependent EU:
V1a(x1a) + V1b(x1b) + V2a(x2a) + V2b(x2b)
By the uniqueness results, we may assume that all V functions are 0 at
0. Independence of E1 from Ca implies that V1a(α) + V2a(β) represents the
same preference relation over R2, the set of all pairs (α, β), as does V1b(α) +
V2b(β) (with the same CCEs). The uniqueness results (that similarly hold
for additive representations on R2) imply that there exists a λba > 0 such
that V1b = λbaV1a and V2b = λbaV2a.
Independence of Ca from E1 implies that V1a(α) + V1b(β) represents the
same preference relation over R2 = {(α, β)} as does V2a(α) + V2b(β). By
the uniqueness results on R2, there exists a λ21 > 0 such that V2a = λ21V1a
and V2b = λ21V1b. We deﬁne U = (1 + λba + λ21 + λbaλ21) × V1, p1a =
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1
1+λba+λ21+λbaλ21
, p1b =
λba
1+λba+λ21+λbaλ21
, p2a =
λ21
1+λba+λ21+λbaλ21
, and p2b =
λ21λba
1+λba+λ21+λbaλ21
. This gives the representation in Statement 2. 
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Assume Statement 1., with weak independence
of E1 from Ca. Let the CCE of (α, β) under Ca be μ. Then so is the
unconditional CCE of the E1 prospect (α1a, β1b, α2a, β2b). We have:
(μ1a, α1b, μ2a, β2b) ∼ (α1a, β1b, α2a, β2b) ∼ (μ1a, μ1b, μ2a, μ2b).
Indiﬀerence between the ﬁrst and third prospect shows that the CCE of (α, β)
under Cb must also be μ. Statement 2. follows.
Assume Statement 2. As in the proof of Theorem 3.2, independence of
E1 from Ca implies for the additive value functions that V1a(α) + V2a(β)
represents the same preference relation over R2 = {(α, β)} as does V1b(α) +
V2b(β). Assuming that all V s are 0 at 0, this implies existence of λba > 0 such
that V1b = λbaV1a and V2b = λbaV2a. Deﬁne P (Ca) =
1
1+λba
, P (Cb) =
λba
1+λba
,
and Vj = (1 + λba)Vja for j = 1, 2. Adapting notation, Statement 3. follows.
It readily follows that Statement 3. implies the other two statements, for
instance because CCEs under Ca and Cb, and unconditional CCEs, all agree.
Thus, all statements are equivalent. 
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Statement 3. readily implies Statement 2., which
readily implies Statement 1. Hence we assume Statement 1., with weak
independence of E1 from Ca, and derive Statement 3.
We ﬁrst show that the decision weights of E1Ca and E2Ca are not aﬀected
by the ranking positions of these events with respect to E1Cb and E2Cb, and
vice versa. We focus on the case where x1a ≥ x2a. By weak independence,
the preferences over these pairs of outcomes are the same irrespective of
where we ﬁx the outcomes under Cb. This means that the proportion of the
92
Chapter3. Statistical Independence for Axiomatizing Bayesian Expected
Utility and Non-Bayesian Ambiguity
decision weights of x1a and x2a are unaﬀected by the ranking positions of the
other two outcomes (Wakker 1993). If we interchange two adjacent ranking
positions of one outcome from x1a, x2a and one of the other two outcomes,
then only the decision weights of these two outcomes can change, but because
of the aforementioned constant proportions, the outcome from x1a, x2a cannot
change its weight. Because decision weights of a prospect always add up to
1, neither of the two decision weights can then change. Hence changes in
rankings between subevents of Ca and Cb never aﬀect decision weights.
Changes in rankings of x1a and x2a do not aﬀect the decision weights of
the other two outcomes and, hence, do not aﬀect the sum of decision weights
of the other two outcomes and, hence, of x1a and x2a themselves. Write
P (Ca) (= W (Ca)) for the former sum, and, similarly, P (Cb) (= W (Cb)).
The RDU functional decomposes into a weighted sum of two RDU function-
als P (Ca)RDU
′(x1a, x2a) + P (Cb)RDU ′′(x1b, x2b). By weak independence,
P (Ca)RDU
′(α, β) + P (Cb)RDU ′′(α, β) and RDU ′(α, β) represent the same
preference over pairs (α, β) and, hence, can be taken proportional. It implies
that RDU is a weighted sum of the same RDU functionals, as in Statement
3. 
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Abstract
We introduce a new type of preference condition for intertempo-
ral choice, which requires present values to be independent of various
other variables. The new conditions are more concise and more trans-
parent than traditional ones. They are directly related to applications
because present values are widely used tools in intertemporal choice.
Our conditions give more general behavioral axiomatizations, which
facilitate normative debates and empirical tests of time inconsisten-
cies and related phenomena. Like other preference conditions, our
conditions can be tested qualitatively. Unlike other preference condi-
tions, our conditions can also be directly tested quantitatively, and we
can verify the required independence of present values from predictors
in regressions. We show how similar types of preference conditions,
imposing independence conditions between directly observable quan-
tities, can be developed for decision contexts other than intertemporal
choice, and can simplify behavioral axiomatizations there. Our pref-
erence conditions are especially eﬃcient if several types of aggrega-
tion are relevant, because we can handle them in one blow. We thus
give an eﬃcient axiomatization of a market pricing system that is (i)
arbitrage-free for hedging uncertainties and (ii) time consistent.
Keywords: intertemporal optimization, present value, discounted
utility, time inconsistency, arbitrage-free, preference axiomatization
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Debates about appropriate models of intertemporal choice, both for the nor-
mative purpose of making optimal decisions and for the descriptive purpose
of ﬁtting decisions, usually focus on the critical preference conditions that
distinguish these models. The two most discussed conditions are time con-
sistency, which plays a role in distinguishing constant and hyperbolic dis-
counting, and intertemporal separability, which pertains to habit formation,
satiation, addiction, and sequencing eﬀects.1 Both time consistency and in-
tertemporal separability are assumed in the classical models but they are
usually violated empirically. Their normative status has also been ques-
tioned.2
To shed new light on the appropriateness of intertemporal decision mod-
els, we introduce a new kind of preference conditions to distinguish them,
stated directly in terms of present values (PVs). PVs are simple and tractable,
and have been widely used in intertemporal choice, both when reﬂecting the
preferences of the ﬁnancial market3 and when reﬂecting subjective prefer-
ences of individuals4. They relate to the indiﬀerences most commonly en-
1See: Attema (2012), Dolan and Kahneman (2008 p. 228), Epper, Fehr-Duda, and
Bruhin (2011), Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002), Keller and Kirkwood
(1999), Loewenstein and Prelec (1993), Tsuchiya and Dolan (2005).
2See: Broome (1991), Gold et al. (1996 p. 100), Parﬁt (1984 Ch. 14), Strotz (1956 p.
178).
3See de Wit (1671), Fisher (1930), and Smith and McCardle (1999). Present values
are used to compute a company’s value when determining stock prices (LeRoy and Porter
1981) and to make investment decisions (Ingersoll and Ross 1992). In such ﬁnancial
decisions at ﬁrm or market levels, utility is usually assumed to be linear and discount
rates follow market interest rates.
4In individual choice experiments, indiﬀerences between a future stream of outcomes
and an immediate outcome (the present value) are usually obtained using choice lists.
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countered in everyday life. We often have to decide on whether to pay up
front for goods consumed later, whether to pay a price now for a ﬁnancial
product with future ﬁnancial consequences, or whether to choose a savings
plan which requires that the money must be delivered now. For these reasons,
present values are widely used in experimental measurements of intertempo-
ral preferences.
People can more easily relate to independence conditions imposed on
present values than to independence preference conditions. “For your present
value of this extra payment on day 10, the payments on the other days do
(not) matter” is easier to relate to for most people than the usual preference
conditions. In general, PVs can depend on many variables, such as the
periods of the receipt of future outcomes, the initial wealth levels at those
periods, and the wealth levels at other periods. Our preference conditions will
impose independence of PVs from some of those other variables. We show
that many models can be characterized by the appropriate independencies.
Like all preference conditions, our conditions can be tested qualitatively.
Unlike other preference conditions, our conditions can also be directly tested
quantitatively. We can, for instance, carry out regressions with PV as the
dependent variable, and the other relevant variables as predictors.5 We can
then test which of those other variables are signiﬁcantly associated with
PV, and whether the variables claimed to be independent in our conditions
really are so. Such tests are more widely known and better understood
than qualitative tests of preference conditions. To illustrate our new PV
Ahlbrecht and Weber (1997) used both choice lists and direct matching to measure present
values. Reviews are in Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) and Soman et al.
(2005).
5Predictors are often called “independent variables.” We avoid this term so as to avoid
confusion
4.1 Introduction 103
M
o
d
e
l
F
u
n
ct
io
n
a
l
P
re
f.
co
n
d
it
io
n
s
P
V
co
n
d
it
io
n
P
V
fo
rm
u
la
N
on
-
∑ T t
=
0
x
t
A
d
d
it
iv
e
+
π
(ϕ
)
ϕ
d
is
co
u
n
te
d
va
lu
e
S
y
m
m
et
ri
c
C
on
st
an
t
∑ T t
=
0
λ
t x
t
A
d
d
it
iv
e
+
π
(ϕ
,t
)
=
τ
(ϕ
,t
+
1)
λ
t ϕ
d
is
co
u
n
te
d
va
lu
e
S
ta
ti
on
ar
y
T
im
e-
d
ep
en
d
en
t
∑ T t
=
0
λ
tx
t
A
d
d
it
iv
e
π
(ϕ
,t
)
λ
tϕ
d
is
co
u
n
te
d
va
lu
e
N
on
-
∑ T t
=
0
U
(x
t)
S
ep
ar
ab
le
+
π
(ϕ
,e
0
,e
t)
U
−1
(U
(e
t
+
ϕ
)−
d
is
co
u
n
te
d
u
ti
li
ty
S
y
m
m
et
ri
c
U
(e
t)
+
U
(e
0
))
−
e 0
C
on
st
an
t
∑ T t
=
0
λ
t U
(x
t)
S
ep
ar
ab
le
+
π
(ϕ
,t
,e
0
,e
t)
=
U
−1
(λ
t U
(e
t
+
ϕ
)−
d
is
co
u
n
te
d
u
ti
li
ty
S
ta
ti
on
ar
y
τ
(ϕ
,t
+
1,
e′ 1
=
e 0
,e
′ t+
1
=
e t
)
λ
t U
(e
t)
+
U
(e
0
))
−
e 0
T
im
e-
d
ep
en
d
en
t
∑ T t
=
0
U
t(
x
t)
S
ep
ar
ab
le
π
(ϕ
,t
,e
0
,e
t)
U
−1 0
(U
t(
e t
+
ϕ
)−
d
is
co
u
n
te
d
u
ti
li
ty
U
t(
e t
)
+
U
0
(e
0
))
−
e 0
T
a
b
le
4
.1
:
T
h
e
co
lu
m
n
“F
u
n
ct
io
n
a
l”
gi
ve
s
th
e
fu
n
ct
io
n
a
l
fo
rm
s
ev
al
u
a
ti
n
g
(x
0
,.
..
,x
T
).
H
er
e:
0
<
λ
is
a
d
is
co
u
n
t
fa
ct
o
r;
0
<
λ
t
is
a
p
er
io
d
-d
ep
en
d
en
t
d
is
co
u
n
t
fa
ct
o
r
w
it
h
λ
0
=
1;
U
is
a
st
ri
ct
ly
in
cr
ea
si
n
g
co
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
u
ti
li
ty
fu
n
ct
io
n
;
U
t
is
a
p
er
io
d
-d
ep
en
d
en
t
st
ri
ct
ly
in
cr
ea
si
n
g
co
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
u
ti
li
ty
fu
n
ct
io
n
.
T
h
e
co
lu
m
n
“
P
re
f.
co
n
d
it
io
n
s”
g
iv
es
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
co
n
d
it
io
n
s
tr
a
d
it
io
n
a
ll
y
u
se
d
in
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
a
x
io
m
a
ti
za
ti
o
n
s
of
th
e
fu
n
ct
io
n
a
l
fo
rm
s,
a
n
d
d
eﬁ
n
ed
in
S
ec
ti
o
n
4
.7
.
T
h
e
co
lu
m
n
“
P
V
co
n
d
it
io
n
”
gi
ve
s
th
e
P
V
co
n
d
it
io
n
u
se
d
in
o
u
r
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
ax
io
m
a
ti
za
ti
o
n
s
in
d
ic
a
ti
n
g
h
ow
π
(ϕ
,t
,e
)
ca
n
b
e
re
w
ri
tt
en
.
H
er
e
π
(ϕ
,t
,e
)
d
en
o
te
s
th
e
p
re
se
n
t
va
lu
e
o
f
re
ce
iv
in
g
ϕ
ex
tr
a
in
p
er
io
d
t
if
th
e
en
d
ow
m
en
t
is
e.
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
d
is
co
u
n
ti
n
g
h
a
s
a
n
ex
tr
a
eq
u
a
li
ty
in
vo
lv
in
g
τ
,
to
m
o
rr
ow
’s
va
lu
e.
N
o
te
th
a
t
th
es
e
ce
ll
s
co
n
ta
in
co
m
p
le
te
d
eﬁ
n
it
io
n
s.
T
h
e
co
lu
m
n
“P
V
fo
rm
u
la
”
g
iv
es
th
e
fo
rm
u
la
o
f
P
V
u
n
d
er
ea
ch
m
o
d
el
.
104 Chapter4. Discounted Utility and Present Value: A Close Relation
conditions, we apply them to some well-known models. Table 4.1 gives a
concise presentation of these models and their representations. Details of
the table will be explained in the following sections. Table 4.1 is presented
here because it illustrates the organization of the models in the ﬁrst four
sections.
We provide the most concise and most general preference axiomatiza-
tions presently available in the literature for: (a) constant discounted value
as commonly used by ﬁnancial markets (Hull 2013); (b) constant discounted
utility (Samuelson 1937); (c) general discounted utility, which includes hyper-
bolic discounting. We also provide results that are relevant to multi-attribute
optimization problems other than intertemporal: (d) no-bookmaking and no-
arbitrage for uncertainty, which are commonly used for ﬁnancial markets; (e)
additive separability for general multi-attribute aggregations (Debreu 1960;
Gorman 1968). In such other contexs we should ﬁnd a quantitative index
that can play a role similar to present value for intertemporal choice. Section
4.6 considers aggregation over two dimensions, for instance, time and uncer-
tainty. Here our technique is particularly eﬃcient because it can handle both
aggregations in one blow. We derive the most common pricing model used
in ﬁnance: as-if risk neutrality together with constant discounting, which
avoids arbitrage for both uncertainty and time.
4.2 Preferences and subjective PVs
We derive appropriateness of an intertemporal goal function V from the
decisions that it implies, modeled through a binary preference relation 
over outcome sequences x = (x0, . . . , xT ) ∈ RT+1. The preferences can, for
instance, concern (i) observed consumer choices in descriptive applications,
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or (ii) pension savings plans or market prices with the ﬁnancial market taken
as decision maker in prescriptive applications. The outcome sequence yields
outcome xt in period t, for each t; t = 0 denotes the present. We assume
T ≥ 2 to avoid trivialities, and keep all other aspects of our analysis as
simple as possible (assuming one ﬁxed T ∈ N) so as to focus on the novelty
of our conditions. We use indexed Roman letters xt to specify the period t
of receipt of outcome xt, and Greek letters α, β, . . . to refer to outcomes (real
numbers) when no period of receipt needs to be speciﬁed. By αtx we denote
x with xt replaced by α.
The goal function V represents  if V : RT+1 → R and x  y ⇔ V (x) ≥
V (y) for all x, y ∈ RT+1. The existence of a representing V implies that  is
a weak order; i.e.,  is complete (x  y or y  x for all x, y) and transitive.
We therefore assume throughout that  is a weak order. Strict preference
, indiﬀerence ∼, reversed preference , and strict reversed preference (≺)
are as usual. We also assume monotonicity (strictly improving an outcome
strictly improves the outcome sequence) and continuity of  throughout.
The conditions imply that all discount weights in this paper are positive,
and that all utility functions are continuous and strictly increasing.
The following condition considers sums of outcomes xt = ϕ+ et. Here we
call et an initial endowment . The speciﬁcation of the initial endowment only
serves to facilitate interpretations and does not refer to any type of reference
dependence. Formally, our analysis is entirely in terms of ﬁnal wealth, and
is classical in this respect.
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Deﬁnition 4.1. π(ϕ, t, e) is the present value (PV) of outcome ϕ received
in period t with (initial) endowment e = (e0, . . . , eT ) if (e0 + π(ϕ, t, e))0e ∼
(et + ϕ)te, i.e.
(e0+π(ϕ, t, e), e1, . . . , et−1, et, et+1, . . . , eT ) ∼ (e0, . . . , et−1, et+ϕ, et+1, . . . , eT ).
(4.1)
Equation 4.1 means that, with e the current endowment, receiving an
additional future outcome ϕ in period t is exactly oﬀset by receiving an
additional present outcome π. That is, the PV of a future outcome ϕ in
period t is π. For simplicity, we assume in this paper that a PV always
exists. Generalizations are discussed in Section 4.8.
By monotonicity, the PV is unique. In applications, PVs (denoted π
here) are often used for general outcome sequences x with endowment e:
(e0 + π)0e ∼ e + x. However, we will not need this general concept in this
paper.
The PV, π, can in general depend on all of ϕ, t, and e, and π is a function
π(ϕ, t, e). As a convention, if we write π without its arguments, then it
designates the general function depending on all its arguments. For t = 0, it
trivially follows that π(ϕ, 0, e) = ϕ. Note that π can be subjective, depending
on , and thus it reﬂects the tastes and attitudes of the decision maker.
The preference conditions presented in the following sections all amount to
independence of PV, π , from some of the variables (ϕ, t, e). We express
this independence by writing only the arguments that π depends on. For
example, if π(ϕ, t, e) depends only on ϕ (i.e., is independent of t and e) then
we write
π = π(ϕ). (4.2)
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Similarly, if π depends on e only through e0 and et, then we write
π = π(ϕ, t, e0, et). (4.3)
Preference conditions should be directly veriﬁable from preferences, the ob-
servable primitives in the revealed preference paradigm, without invoking
theoretical constructs such as utilities. In Section 4.7, we show how our PV
conditions can be rewritten in terms of preferences. They are therefore gen-
uine preference conditions, and our conditions can be tested in the same way
as all qualitative preference conditions.
4.3 Linear utility
This section considers models with linear utility, as commonly used in ﬁ-
nancial markets. Such models can serve as approximations for subjective
individual choices if the stakes are moderate (Epper, Fehr-Duda, and Bruhin
2011; Luce 2000 p. 86; Pigou 1920 p. 785). The ﬁrst model in Table 4.2
maximizes the sum of outcomes:
Non–Discounted Value:
T∑
t=0
xt. (4.4)
This model does not involve subjective parameters, is directly observable,
and does therefore not need a preference axiomatization. But it serves well
as a ﬁrst illustration of the nature of PV conditions.
Theorem 4.1. The following two statements are equivalent:
1. Non-discounted value holds.
2. π = π(ϕ).
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Throughout this chapter, Condition 4.n.2 refers to Statement 2. of The-
orem 4.n. Theorem 4.1 shows that if π depends only on ϕ (Condition 4.1.2)
in whatever general sense one might think of, then it must be through the
identity function π(ϕ) = ϕ. This implication may seem surprising at ﬁrst,
the more so as Condition 4.1.2 in addition implies the summation operation
in non-discounted value in Eq. 4.4. To illustrate the strength of Condition
4.1.2, ﬁrst note that substituting t = 0 already implies that ϕ can only be
the identity. The following informal proof further illustrates the condition:
According to Condition 4.1.2, the extra value of any extra future outcome
is always the same, and can therefore be added to today’s wealth. Then all
that matters is the sum of all future outcomes, which may as well be received
immediately today. The implication π(ϕ) = ϕ can also be inferred from the
last two columns of the corresponding row of Table 4.2.
Our next model involves a subjective parameter, the discount factor λ:
Constant Discounted Value:
T∑
t=0
λtxt for λ > 0. (4.5)
By monotonicity, λ > 0. Under the usual assumption that the decision maker
is impatient, we have λ ≤ 1. In PV calculations of cash ﬂows, constant
discounted value is commonly used, setting λ = 1/(1+ r) with r the interest
or discount rate of the market. In this case, if the decision maker is, say, an
individual ﬁnancial trader, the discount factor λ is not a subjective parameter
reﬂecting the attitude of the decision maker but it is a given constant, publicly
known and determined by the market. The following theorem then does not
apply to the ﬁnancial trader in the role of decision maker.
The following theorem is still relevant for market pricings if the ﬁnancial
market is the decision maker who determines (rational) PVs. Then λ reﬂects
the market attitude, which may, for instance, be determined by the attitude
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of a central bank choosing a goal function for its optimal control problem, and
which in this sense is subjective. Condition 4.2.2 rationalizes this common
evaluation system. In other contexts where the parameter λ reﬂects the
attitude of an individual decision maker, it will probably be inﬂuenced by
the market interest rate but need not be identical to it, for instance, because
it may incorporate extra risks borne (Smith and McCardle 1999, Smith 1998).
In the following theorem, we use tomorrow’s value as an analogue to PV,
deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 4.2. τ is tomorrow’s value of an outcome ϕ received in period t
(t ≥ 1) with endowment e, denoted τ = τ(ϕ, t, e), if (e1 + τ)1e ∼ (et + ϕ)te,
i.e.,
(e0, e1 + τ, e2, . . . , et, . . . , eT ) ∼ (e0, e1, . . . , et + ϕ, . . . , eT ). (4.6)
Here τ is the extra outcome in period 1 that exactly oﬀsets the extra
outcome ϕ in period t. Thus τ is tomorrow’s PV. Such “future” present val-
ues are central tools in recursive intertemporal models (Campbell and Shiller
1987; Ju and Miao 2012 and their references; Maccheroni, Marinacci, and
Rustichini 2006). Experimental measurements of subjective individual dis-
counting in studies often compare present values with tomorrow’s values. To
measure the latter, so-called front-end delays are then added (Ahlbrecht and
Weber 1997; Luhmann 2013). The main violations of time consistency occur
when present value is changed into tomorrow’s value (immediacy eﬀect), and
this eﬀect is central in the popular quasi-hyperbolic discount model (Laibson
1997). Section 8 discusses preference conditions for the following theorem
entirely in terms of present values. We prefer using tomorrow’s value here
because it leads to the most appealing condition that we have been able to
ﬁnd. As with π, if we write τ without its arguments then it designates the
general function depending on all its arguments.
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Theorem 4.2. The following two statements are equivalent:
1. Constant discounted value holds.
2. π = π(ϕ, t) = τ(ϕ, t+ 1) = τ . 6
In Statement 1., the discount factor λ (λ as in Eq. 4.5) is uniquely deter-
mined.
Condition 4.2.2 entails that π and τ are independent of the endowments,
and that tomorrow’s perception of future income is the same as today’s. The
condition implies that PV depends only on stopwatch time (time diﬀerences)
and not on calendar time (absolute time).
Statement 4.2.2 formulates the common stationarity in a simpliﬁed man-
ner for the case of linear utility. Only one future outcome ϕ and one present
value today (π) or tomorrow (τ) are involved, rather than involving general
preferences between general outcome sequences as in common formulations.
Most tests of stationarity in the literature are, in fact, tests of our simpliﬁed
condition (see Takeuchi 2010 and his extensive survey), which captures the
essence of the condition.
Many studies have shown that constant discounting is violated empiri-
cally. Hence the following generalization is of interest:
Time-Dependent-Discounted Value:
T∑
t=0
λtxt (with λ0 = 1). (4.7)
The weights λt are all positive by monotonicity. This model allows for general
discount weights with unrestricted time dependence. Many special cases of
6The notation here is short for: π = π(ϕ, t, e) = π(ϕ, t) = τ(ϕ, t + 1) = τ(ϕ, t + 1, e′).
The two endowments e and e′ are immaterial, and are allowed to be diﬀerent. Because of
the shift by one period, the condition is imposed only for all t < T . Existence of π and
the equality in Statement 4.2.2 imply that τ also exists.
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such discount weights have been studied in the literature, the best-known
being hyperbolic discounting. The representation in Eq. 4.7 is not aﬀected
if all λts are multiplied by the same positive factor. The common scaling
λ0 = 1 is therefore always possible.
Theorem 4.3. The following two statements are equivalent:
1. Time-dependent discounted value holds.
2. π = π(ϕ, t).
In Statement 1., the discount factors λt (λt as in Eq. 4.7) are uniquely de-
termined.
An implication that can be inferred from the last two columns of Table
4.2 is that if π is any function of ϕ and t then it must be the function λt×ϕ.
4.4 Nonlinear utility
The models presented in the preceding section take a weighted or unweighted
sum of the outcomes. They assume constant marginal utility in the sense
that an extra euro received in a particular period gives the same utility
increment regardless of the endowment of that period. In individual choice,
unlike market pricing, this condition is often violated empirically and it is
not normative. More realistic and more popular models allow for nonlinear
utility. Then marginal utility depends on the endowment, and the models of
the preceding section become:
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Non-Discounted Utility:
T∑
t=0
U(xt); (4.8)
Constant Discounted Utility:
T∑
t=0
λtU(xt); (4.9)
Time-Dependent Discounted Utility:
T∑
t=0
Ut(xt). (4.10)
Continuity and monotonicity of  readily imply λ > 0 and strict increasing-
ness and continuity of U and all Uts. Eq. 4.9 is Samuelson’s (1937) discounted
utility, the most popular model for intertemporal choice. Each utility model
reduces to the corresponding value model if utility is linear. In particular, in
time-dependent discounted utility, if the Ut(α) are linear, they can be writ-
ten as λt × α and we can renormalize them such that λ0 = 1, resulting in
time-dependent discounted value results.
The mathematics underlying the preference axiomatizations of the utility
models in Eqs. 4.8 - 4.10 is more advanced than for Theorems 4.1, 4.2, and
4.3. Whereas these theorems solved linear equalities, we now have to deal
with nonlinear equalities, with nonlinear utilities intervening. Fortunately,
this increased mathematical complexity does not show up in the preference
conditions and, consequently, in the empirical tests of the models. The rel-
evant PV preference conditions are obtained directly from those deﬁned in
Section 4.3 by adding dependence on the endowment levels e0 and et. This
way we readily obtain Theorems 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 from Theorems 4.1, 4.2,
and 4.3, respectively.
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Theorem 4.4. The following two statements are equivalent:
1. Non-discounted utility holds.
2. π = π(ϕ, e0, et).
7
The following uniqueness result holds for Statement 1: A real-valued time-
independent constant μ can be added to U (U as in Eq. 4.8), and U can be
multiplied by a positive constant ν.
An implication, displayed in the last two columns of Table 4.2, is that
if π is any function of ϕ, e0, and et, then it must be of the form displayed
there.
Several authors have argued that any discounting, even if consistent over
time, is irrational, and have thus recommended using non-discounted utility
for intertemporal choice (Jevons 1871 pp. 72-73; Ramsey 1928; Rawls 1971).
Condition 4.4.2 characterizes this proposal. Studies providing preference
axiomatizations for non-discounted utility (sums of utilities) include Kopylov
(2010), Krantz et al. (1971), Marinacci (1998), Pivato (2014), and Wakker
(1986). We now turn to discounting.
Theorem 4.5. The following two statements are equivalent:
1. Constant discounted utility holds.
2. π = π(ϕ, t, e0, et) = τ(ϕ, t+ 1, e
′
1 = e0, e
′
t+1 = et).
8
7Here t refers to the period where ϕ is added and et speciﬁes the endowment in that
period. Note that, whereas π depends on the level of et, it does not depend explicitly on
period t, which we denote by suppressing t from the arguments of π(. . .).
8The condition implies that the endowment levels ej , j = 0, t of the PV endowment e,
and similarly the endowment levels e′j , j = 1, t + 1 of the tomorrow-value endowment e′,
are immaterial. Existence of π and the equality imply that τ also exists. The condition
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The following uniqueness result holds for Statement 1: A real-valued time-
independent constant μ can be added to U (U and λ as in Eq 4.9) and U can
be multiplied by a positive constant ν. λ is uniquely determined.
The ﬁrst preference axiomatization of constant discounted utility was in
Koopmans (1960), with generalizations in Harvey (1995), Bleichrodt, Rohde,
and Wakker (2008), and Kopylov (2010). Condition 4.5.2 requires that the
same tradeoﬀs are made tomorrow as today. Such requirements have some-
times been taken as rationality requirements (see the introduction). The
following theorem generalizes Theorem 4.3.
Theorem 4.6. The following two statements are equivalent:
1. Time-dependent discounted utility holds.
2. π = π(ϕ, t, e0, et).
The following uniqueness result holds for Statement 1: A time-dependent real
constant μt can be added to every Ut (Ut as in Eq. 4.10), and all Ut’s can be
multiplied by a joint positive constant ν.
Statement 4.6.2 expresses that the tradeoﬀs between periods 0 and t are
independent of what happens in the other periods, reﬂecting a kind of separa-
bility. Time-dependent discounted utility is a general additive representation,
which has been axiomatized several times before.9 It implies intertemporal
holds for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, and whenever e′1 = e0 and e′t+1 = et. We use the convenient
argument matching notation popular in programming languages (R: see R Core Team 2013,
Python: see Python Software Foundation 2013, Scala: see Ecole Polytechnique Federale
de Lausanne 2013, among others) to express the latter two restrictions. Here the formal
argument of a function (e′1 or e
′
t+1) is assigned a value (e0 or et).
9See Debreu (1960), Gorman (1968), Krantz et al. (1971), Wakker (1989).
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separability, which is arguably the most questionable assumption of most in-
tertemporal choice models (Baucells and Sarin 2007; Dolan and Kahneman
2008). Another generalization of time-dependent discounted value (eq. 4.7)
can be considered, which is intermediate between Eqs. 4.9 and 4.10.
T∑
t=0
λtU(xt). (4.11)
We have not yet succeeded in ﬁnding an appealing present value condition
for this representation.
4.5 Applications to contexts other than in-
tertemporal choice
The mathematical results of the previous sections and the preference condi-
tions used can be applied in contexts other than intertemporal choice. For
instance, Theorem 4.3 is of special interest for decision under uncertainty,
capturing nonarbitrage in ﬁnance. To see this point, we reinterpret the peri-
ods t as states of nature. Exactly one state obtains, but it is uncertain which
one (Savage 1954). Now x = (x0, . . . , xT ) refers to an uncertain prospect
yielding outcomes xt if state of nature t obtains. For simplicity, we focus on
a single time for all outcomes here, so that discounting plays no role. The
next section will consider both uncertainty and time. If we divide the dis-
count weights λt by their sum
∑T
t=0 λt (relaxing the requirement of λ0 = 1),
they sum to 1, and the representation becomes subjective expected value.
Subjective expected value was ﬁrst axiomatized by de Finetti (1937) using
a no-book argument, which is equivalent to the no-arbitrage condition of
ﬁnance. In ﬁnance, the representation is as-if risk neutral, and the decision
maker is the market which sets rational prices for state-contingent assets.
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For state j, a state-contingent asset x = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) yields outcome
1 if j happens and nothing otherwise. In this interpretation,
lambdaj becomes the market price of this state-contingent asset, and PV is
the oﬀsetting quantity of state-0-contingent assets. Condition 4.3.2 provides
the most concise formulation of the no-book and the no-arbitrage principle
presently available in the literature.
For decision under uncertainty, certainty equivalents are more natural
quantities than state-contingent prices. Reformulating our conditions in
terms of certainty equivalents is a topic for future research. For decision un-
der risk, Eq. 4.8 can be interpreted as von Neumann-Morgenstern expected
utility for equal-probability lotteries, which essentially covers all lotteries
with rational probabilities (writing every probability i/j as i probabilities
1/j). Eq. 4.8 can also be interpreted as ambiguity under complete absence of
information (Gravel, Marchant, and Sen 2012). Eq. 4.10 is Debreu’s (1960)
additively separable utility. Here again, our Statement 4.6.2 provides the
most concise preference axiomatization presently available in the literature.
4.6 Time and uncertainty: Aggregating over
two dimensions
This section applies our technique to aggregations over two dimensions. We
consider the special case where one dimension refers to time and the other
refers to uncertainty. In applications, usually both time and uncertainty play
a role (Smith and McCardle 1999). We assume periods 0, . . . , T and states of
nature 0, . . . , n. Exactly one state is true but the decision maker is uncertain
which one. We consider (T + 1) × (n + 1) tuples (x0,0, . . . , xT,n) yielding
outcome xt,s in period t if state of nature s is true. Such tuples are called
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act sequences . Thus, every period yields an act (map from states to R),
and every state of nature yields an outcome sequence. Constant discounted
expected value is
T∑
t=0
n∑
s=0
λtpsxt,s (4.12)
with λ > 0, ps > 0 for all s, and
∑
ps = 1. Constant discounted expected
value is the common evaluation system used in cost-eﬀectiveness studies and
by ﬁnancial markets. In the latter case, the pjs and λ are the parameters.
They are subjective from the market perspective. The evaluation formula is
both arbitrage-free and time consistent (under the common time invariance).
We use state-contingent present values, deﬁned as follows, and using pay-
oﬀs in state 0 and period 0 for calibration: π = π(ϕ, t, s, e0,0, e0,1, . . . , eT,n) is
such that
(e0,0 + π, e0,1, . . . , et,s, . . . , eT,n) ∼ (e0,0, e0,1, . . . , et,s + ϕ, . . . , eT,n). (4.13)
The following reinforcement of monotonicity is common in decision under
uncertainty. First, we identify a sure outcome sequence (x0, . . . , xT ) with the
act sequence that assigns xt to each (t, s), and we induce preferences over
outcome sequences (T + 1 tuples) this way. Second, we deﬁne dominance to
hold if: (a) Preferences over outcome sequences satisfy monotonicity and, (b)
replacing an outcome sequence contingent on a state of nature s by a weakly
(strictly) preferred outcome sequence leads to a weakly (strictly) preferred
(T + 1) × (n + 1) tuple. In the next theorem, we use the same notation for
tomorrow’s value τ as in Section 4.3, but now it is state-contingent. That
is, we now use payoﬀs in state 0 and period 1 (tomorrow) for calibration:
τ = τ(ϕ, t, s, e0,0, e0,1, . . . , eT,n) is such that
(e0,0, . . . , e0,n, e1,0+τ, e1,1 . . . , et,s, . . . , eT,n) ∼ (e0,0, e0,1, . . . , et,s+ϕ, . . . , eT,n).
(4.14)
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Theorem 4.7. Assume that  is a binary relation on R(T+1)×(n+1). It is rep-
resented by constant discounted expected value if and only if it is a continuous
weak order satisfying dominance and:
π(ϕ, t, s) = τ(ϕ, t+ 1, s). (4.15)
The parameters λ, p1, . . . , pn (as in Eq. 4.12) are uniquely determined.
For extending this result to nonlinear utility, expected utility for the
aggregation over the states of nature (using an analog of Eq. 4.11) is of special
interest. We leave this as a topic for future research. There is currently much
interest in models with both risk and time, and their interactions. Baucells
and Heukamp (2012) proposed a very general decision model. As in the
preceding section, it is also desirable to obtain results in terms of present
certainty equivalents rather than in terms of present contingent payments
here. For example, Smith (1998) considered a combination of risk and time
in a theoretical study, combining present values with certainty equivalents,
Ahlbrecht and Weber (1997) did the same in an experimental study, and
Pelsser and Stadje (2014) considered market pricings as in Theorem 4.7.
4.7 Proofs and clariﬁcation of the empirical
status of PV conditions
We ﬁrst present the proofs of Theorems 4.1 - 4.6. We ﬁrst present the proofs
of Theorems 4.1-4.6. We present them from most to least general because
this approach is most clarifying and most eﬃcient. The presentation of the
proofs clariﬁes the relationship between our PV conditions and well-known
preference conditions, showing that PV conditions indeed are preference con-
ditions. In each proof, we start from our PV condition, which is always
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weaker than the conditions that are derived and that are commonly used
in the literature. We thus show that our PV conditions give stronger re-
sults. Because each Statement 2. is immediately implied by substitution of
the functional, we throughout assume Statement 2. and derive Statement 1.
and the uniqueness results.
We ﬁrst present the proofs of Theorems 4.1-4.6. We present them from
most to least general because this approach is most clarifying and most ef-
ﬁcient. The presentation of the proofs clariﬁes the relationship between our
PV conditions and well-known preference conditions, showing that PV con-
ditions indeed are preference conditions. In each proof, we start from our
PV condition, which is always weaker than the conditions that are derived
and that are commonly used in the literature. We thus show that our PV
conditions give stronger results. Because each Statement 2. is immediately
implied by substitution of the functional, we throughout assume Statement
2. and derive Statement 1. and the uniqueness results.
Proof of Theorem 4.6
The uniqueness results for Statement 4.6.1, which uses Eq. 4.10, fol-
low from well-known uniqueness results in the literature (Krantz et al. 1971
Theorem 6.13; Wakker 1989 Observation III.6.6). We next derive Statement
4.6.1.
The equality π(ϕ, t, e) = π(ϕ, t, e0, et) in Condition 4.6.2 means that π is
independent of ej, j = 0, t. This holds if and only if
(e0 + π, e1, . . . , et−1, et, et+1, . . . eT ) ∼ (e0, e1, . . . , et−1, et + ϕ, et+1, . . . eT ) ⇒
(e0 + π, e
′
1, . . . , e
′
t−1, et, e
′
t+1, . . . e
′
T ) ∼ (e0, e′1, . . . , e′t−1, et + ϕ, e′t+1, . . . e′T ).(4.16)
This holds if and only if the implication holds with twice preference 
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instead of indiﬀerence ∼.10 Eq. 4.16 with preference instead of indiﬀerence
is known as separability of {0, t} (Gorman 1968). By repeated application
of Gorman (1968), separability of every set {0, t} holds if and only if  is
separable; i.e., every subset of {0, . . . , T} is separable (preferences are inde-
pendent of the levels where outcomes outside this subset are kept ﬁxed, as
with separability of {0, t}). This holds if and only if an additively decompos-
able representation holds11, which we call time-dependent discounted utility
in the main text. 
Proof of Theorem 4.5
The uniqueness results for Statement 4.5.1, which uses Eq. 4.9, follow
from those in Theorem 4.6, where, in terms of Eq. 4.10, λ is the proportion
Ut+1/Ut for any t. It is useful to note that the sum of weights,
∑
λt, is the
same for each outcome sequence, implying that there is no special role for
utility value 0. We next derive Statement 4.5.1.
The equality π(ϕ, t, e0, et) = τ(ϕ, t + 1, e
′
1 = e0, e
′
t+1 = et) in Condition
4.5.2 means that π is independent of ej, j = 0, t, T (as in Theorem 4.6, but
now only for t < T ), but also of whether it is measured in period 0 or period
1. This holds if and only if, writing α for e0 = e
′
1 and β for et = e
′
t+1,
(α + π, e1, . . . , et−1, β, et+1, . . . eT ) ∼ (α, e1, . . . , et−1, β + ϕ, et+1, . . . eT ) ⇔
(e′0, α + π, . . . , e
′
t−1, e
′
t, β, . . . e
′
T ) ∼ (e′0, α, . . . , e′t−1, e′t, β + ϕ, . . . e′T ).(4.17)
It implies separability of {0, t} for all t < T , as in Theorem 4.6, but now,
instead of separability of {0, T} we have separability of all {1, t + 1} for all
10If the upper indiﬀerence is changed into a strict preference, then we ﬁnd π′ < π to
give indiﬀerence. The lower indiﬀerence follows with π′ instead of π. By monotonicity,
replacing π′ by π leads to the lower strict preference.
11See Debreu (1960), Gorman (1968), Krantz et al. (1971 Theorem 6.13), Wakker (1989
Theorem III.6.6).
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t < T . The latter separability can, for instance, be seen by replacing all
primes in Eq. 4.17 by double primes, which should not aﬀect the second
indiﬀerence because of the maintained equivalence with the ﬁrst indiﬀer-
ence. By repeated application of Gorman (1968), we still get separability
of . Hence the above condition holds if and only if: time-dependent dis-
counted utility holds with, further, U0, Ut additively representing the same
preference relation over R2 as U1, Ut+1 do. We can set Ut(0) = 0 for all t.
Then, by standard uniqueness results (Wakker 1989 Observation III.6.6′),
U1/U0 = Ut+1/Ut = λ for a positive constant λ. This proves the equivalence
in Theorem 4.5. Because Condition 4.5.2 implies constant discounted utility,
it implies stationarity , used by Koopmans (1960) to axiomatize the model.
The latter condition is deﬁned as follows:
(x0, x1, . . . , xT−1, cT )  (y0, y1, . . . , yT−1, cT ) ⇔
(c0, x0, . . . , xT−1)  (c0, y0, . . . , yT−1). (4.18)
Our condition is weaker by considering tradeoﬀs between two periods, keeping
the outcomes in all other periods ﬁxed. 
Proof of Theorem 4.4
The uniqueness results for Statement 4.4.1, which uses Eq. 4.8, follow
from those in Theorem 4.5. We next derive Statement 4.4.1.
The equality π(ϕ, t, e) = π(ϕ, e0, et) in Condition 4.4.2 means that π is
not only independent of ej, j = 0, t, as in Theorem 4.6, but also of t. This
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holds if and only if12
(e0 + π, e1, . . . , et−1, et, et+1, . . . eT ) ∼
(e0, e1, . . . , et−1, et + ϕ, et+1, . . . eT )
implies
(e0 + π, e
′
1, . . . , e
′
t′−1, (et)t′ , e
′
t′+1, . . . e
′
T ) ∼
(e0, e
′
1, . . . , e
′
t′−1, (et)t′ + ϕ, e
′
t′+1, . . . e
′
T ) . (4.19)
It readily follows that the above condition holds if and only if we have all
the conditions of Theorem 4.6 and its representation, with the extra condi-
tion Ut(et + ϕ) − Ut(et) = Ut′(et + ϕ) − Ut′(et), implying that we can take
all functions Ut the same, independent of t. It implies symmetry, the con-
dition commonly used in the literature to axiomatize non-discounted utility.
Symmetry requires invariance of preference under every permutation of the
outcomes. Symmetry immediately implies that π is independent of t, which
is what Condition 4.4.2 adds to Condition 4.6.2. This shows once again that
the PV conditions are weak compared to conditions commonly used in the
literature. 
Proof of Theorems 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3
The uniqueness of the discount parameters in Theorems 4.2 and 4.3, based
on Eqs. 4.5 and 4.7, follows from the uniqueness results of Theorems 4.6 and
4.5. We next derive the Statements 1.
The proof of Theorem 4.3 [4.2, 4.1] readily follows from Theorem 4.6, [4.5,
4.4], as follows. The theorems to be proved are the linear counterparts of
the theorems from which they follow. The preference conditions are always
the same except that dependence of the endowment levels e0, et has been
12In the following equation we write (et)t′ for e
′
t′ to indicate that the t
′ level of e′ is the
same as et, the tth level of e.
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dropped. In the notation of Theorem 4.6 this means that Ut(et+ϕ)−Ut(et)
is independent of et, which implies linearity of Ut. Similarly, the utility
functions in Theorems 4.5 and 4.4 are linear. Then Theorems 4.3, 4.2, and
4.1 follow. 
For completeness, we show how the conditions of Theorems 4.1 - 4.3 can
be restated directly in terms of preferences:
The equality π = π(ϕ, t) in Condition 4.3.2 holds if and only if
(e0 + π, e1, . . . , et−1, et, et+1, . . . eT ) ∼
(e0, e1, . . . , et−1, et + ϕ, et+1, . . . eT )
implies
(e′0 + π, e
′
1, . . . , e
′
t−1, e
′
t, e
′
t+1, . . . e
′
T ) ∼
(e′0, e
′
1, . . . , e
′
t−1, e
′
t + ϕ, e
′
t+1, . . . e
′
T ) . (4.20)
The equality π = π(ϕ, t) = τ(ϕ, t+ 1) in Condition 4.2.2 holds if and only if
(e0 + π, e1, . . . , et−1, et, et+1, . . . eT ) ∼
(e0, e1, . . . , et−1, et + ϕ, et+1, . . . eT )
if and only if
(e′0, e
′
1 + π, . . . , e
′
t−1, e
′
t, e
′
t+1, . . . e
′
T ) ∼
(e′0, e
′
1, . . . , e
′
t−1, e
′
t, e
′
t+1 + ϕ, . . . e
′
T ) . (4.21)
124 Chapter4. Discounted Utility and Present Value: A Close Relation
The equality π = π(ϕ) in Condition 4.1.2 holds if and only if
(e0 + π, e1, . . . , et−1, et, et+1, . . . eT ) ∼
(e0, e1, . . . , et−1, et + ϕ, et+1, . . . eT )
implies
(e′0 + π, e
′
1, . . . , e
′
t′−1, et′ , e
′
t′+1, . . . e
′
T ) ∼
(e′0, e
′
1, . . . , e
′
t′−1, et′ + ϕ, e
′
t′+1, . . . e
′
T ) . (4.22)
We next compare the PV conditions in Theorems 4.1 - 4.3 with other condi-
tions used in the literature to axiomatize the models in question. Condition
4.3.2 implies that the extra value of an extra outcome ϕ is independent of
the level et to which it is added. This is implied by the well known additivity
condition, requiring that a preference x  y is not aﬀected by adding the
same constant α to xt and yt. By adding the same constant to et and et+ϕ,
we can change them into e′t and e
′
t + ϕ, implying our preference condition.
Additivity is necessary and suﬃcient for time-dependent discounted utility
(Wakker 2010 Theorem 1.6.1). It is more restrictive than our condition be-
cause we only consider tradeoﬀs between two periods, keeping the outcomes
in all other periods ﬁxed. Similar observations apply to the elementary The-
orem 4.2 and the trivial Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.7
As before, necessity of the preference conditions is obvious, so that we
assume the preference conditions and derive constant discounted expected
value and the uniqueness results.
Statement 2. implies that π can be written as π(ϕ, t, s) and is independent
of the endowments. By Theorem 4.3, treating the paired indexes (t, s) as one
index with index (0, 0) here playing the role of index 0 in Theorem 4.3,
we obtain a linear representation
∑T
t=0
∑n
s=0 μt,sxt,s. We do not impose the
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restriction that μ0,0 = 1 here and, hence, the weights are uniquely determined
up to one common positive factor.
By dominance, for every ﬁxed s we have the same preference relation
over outcome sequences. Hence, each such reference relation is represented
by a positive constant (depending on s) times
∑T
t=0 μt,0xt,s. This follows
from the uniqueness result of Theorem 4.3, now applied with s kept ﬁxed,
and with the requirement λ0 = 1 (here μ0,0) dropped. We can rewrite the
representation as
∑T
t=0
∑n
s=0 λtpsxt,s with the ps’s summing to 1 and, hence,
uniquely determined. We can renormalize further so that λ0 = 1, after which
all weights are uniquely determined. By Theorem 4.2, λt = λ
t for λ = λ1.
Thus constant discounted expected value holds and uniqueness of the weights
has also been established. 
4.8 Discussion
The primary purpose of preference axiomatizations is to make decision mod-
els with theoretical constructs directly observable, by restating their exis-
tence (Statements 1. in our theorems) in terms of preference conditions
(Statements 2. in our theorems). The simpler the preference conditions, the
better they clarify the empirical meaning of the decision models. Similar-
ity between the preference conditions and the functional helps to clarify the
empirical meaning of the decision model. Hence this paper has introduced
preference axiomatizations that are as simple as possible and that reﬂect the
corresponding decision models as well and transparently as possible.
The conditions in our Statements 2. use fewer words and characters than
any conditions previously proposed in the literature, which provides an objec-
tive criterion for our claim that they are the most concise conditions presently
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existing. Further, we think that our conditions are easy to understand and
test because present values are familiar objects. PVs can be used as the goal
functions to be optimized in intertemporal choice. At the same time, they
are directly deﬁned in terms of preferences and, hence, the subjective and
behavioral character of preference axiomatizations is not lost by using PVs.
Our eﬃcient results are based on this dual nature of PVs.
We used tomorrow’s values in the characterizations of constant discount-
ing, but conditions entirely in terms of present values are also possible. For
example π(ϕ, t) =
√
π(ϕ, t− 1)π(ϕ, t+ 1) characterizes constant discounted
value. We were unable to ﬁnd an easy way to extend this condition to non-
linear utility. An alternative condition is
π(ϕ, t) = π(π(ϕ, 1), t− 1),
reﬂecting that the recursive structure at period t should be the same as
at period 1 under constant discounting. The condition can be extended to
nonlinear utility by specifying the relevant e levels:
π(ϕ, t, e0, et) = π(π(ϕ, 1, e
′
0 = et−1, e
′
1 = et), t− 1, e0, et−1).
Because of the many e levels, the latter condition is not very transparent.
Our formulations using tomorrow’s value are more transparent. This case
suggests that it is not always easy to ﬁnd simple reformulations of preference
conditions in terms of present values. We were also unable to ﬁnd an easy
condition in terms of present values for the representation
∑T
t=0 λtU(xt) (Eq.
4.11). This second case is of special interest in decision under uncertainty
where each t designates a state of nature and the representation reﬂects the
general expected utility representation.
The preference conditions directly corresponding with our present value
conditions are weaker (leading to stronger theorems) than the ones com-
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monly used in the literature. First, our present value conditions relate to
indiﬀerences rather than preferences. Conditions for indiﬀerences are logi-
cally weaker, making their implications logically stronger.13
An empirical advantage of our preference conditions is that they can be
directly tested using statistical techniques such as analyses of variance and
regressions. For example, if we take PV as the dependent variable, Eq.
4.3 predicts that ϕ, t, e0, and e1 may be signiﬁcant predictors, but the ej’s
with j = 0, t are not. We can test this prediction using standard regression
analyses. These allow us to use the sophisticated probabilistic error theories
underlying econometric regressions, which are easier to use than the more
recently developed error theories for preferences (Wilcox 2008). There is
extensive data on the present values of future options in the ﬁnancial market,
which can be used to test the various independence conditions proposed in
this paper. For individual choice, we are not aware of tests of preference
axioms using regression techniques. Such tests become possible through the
theorems presented here.
In the main text, we conﬁned our analysis to periods with upper bound
T . Many papers have studied extensions of representations to inﬁnitely many
periods. Usually, in the ﬁrst stage representation results are established for
ﬁnitely many periods. Then in the next stage, the extension to inﬁnitely
many periods, continuity conditions are added to avoid diverging or unde-
ﬁned summations. Such two-stage techniques can readily be used to extend
13Our conditions only involve the simplest tradeoﬀs possible, involving the change of
the present outcome and one future outcome. This further enhances their generality. For
example, commonly used stationarity conditions are more restrictive than the conditions in
our Statements 4.4.2 and 4.5.2. The derivations of the full force preference conditions used
in the literature from our preference conditions are based on known techniques (including
Gorman 1968), and in this sense are not very innovative.
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our results to inﬁnitely many periods, where we can simply copy the sec-
ond stage of previous analyses. An advanced general reference is Pivato
(2014). Further references for nondiscounted utility include Alcantud and
Dubey (2014), Basu and Mitra (2007), and Marinacci (1998); for constant
discounted utility, see Harvey (1995), Bleichrodt, Rohde, and Wakker (2008),
and Kopylov (2010); for time-dependent discounted utility, see Hubner and
Suck (1993), Streufert (1995), and Wakker and Zank (1999).
We assumed that present values always exist, which implies that utility (in
period 0) is unbounded from both sides. These restrictions can be dropped if
we modify the preference conditions to hold only if all present values involved
exist. In proofs of theorems, we ﬁrst obtain the preference conditions in full
force for every outcome sequence only in a neighborhood of that outcome
sequence. This neighborhood is small enough to ensure that all present
values required there exist. Next we combine these local representations into
one global representation using the techniques of Chateauneuf and Wakker
(1993). Their technique works for our most general model, time-dependent
discounted utility and, hence, covers all cases considered in this paper.
The follow-up paper Keskin (2015) provides extensions of our results to
some popular hyperbolic discount models, while still maintaining intertempo-
ral separability. Extensions to more general intertemporal models are a topic
for future research, as are further extensions to other optimization contexts.
4.9 Conclusion
We have introduced a new kind of preference condition for intertemporal
choice, which requirings (quantitative) present values to be independent of
particular other variables. The quantitative index should be directly ob-
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servable, so that the independence requirements are observable preference
conditions that can be directly tested qualitatively and can be used in the-
oretical preference axiomatization. Unlike usual preference conditions, our
conditions and their independence requirements can also be directly tested
quantitatively. Our conditions are more concise and transparent than con-
ditions proposed before in the literature, and they are weaker, leading to
stronger theorems. The technique of expressing preference conditions as in-
dependence conditions for directly observable quantitative indexes can be
extended to other decision contexts such as decision under uncertainty to
give new concise conditions that can easily be tested empirically.
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Abstract
When a sequence of outcomes needs to be evaluated for making de-
cisions in an intertemporal setting, the common practice in economic
theory is to compute the discounted utility of the sequence using con-
stant discounting. Despite its prevalence, this particular functional
form has frequently been challenged on empirical grounds. As a re-
sult, many alternative models have been proposed to explain violations
of this model. This paper studies two such models, namely variation
aversion and decreasing impatience, that can accommodate common
violations of constant discounted utility. Earlier work on these mod-
els presented their characterizations in terms of preference conditions
that can be cumbersome and hence diﬃcult to use in experimental
studies for testing the theories. It is shown that the functional forms
in these models can more easily be characterized by conditions based
on present value. Being a familiar and intuitive concept, present value
simpliﬁes the existing characterizations and is empirically easy to ob-
serve.
Keywords: present value, intertemporal choice, discounted utility,
variation aversion, hyperbolic discounting, decreasing impatience.
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5.1 Introduction
Since its introduction by Samuelson (1937), the constant discounted utility
(CDU) function has been the most prominent tool for intertemporal choice
in economics. Its particular functional form has two important properties: it
is additively separable and uses constant discounting. Although analytically
useful, both properties have been shown to be violated empirically (Loewen-
stein & Prelec (1992), Loewenstein & Prelec (1993), Loewenstein & Thaler
(1989)). This paper studies two appealing alternatives to CDU, variation
aversion Gilboa (1989) and decreasing impatience Prelec (2004), that can
accommodate the violations of these two properties and gives characteriza-
tions of these models in terms of present value.
Present value is deﬁned as follows: Assume that an agent is endowed
with a stream of payments spread over a ﬁnite time. In this endowment,
suppose that we change the amount in one of the future periods, keeping
other periods’ amounts the same. This gives a new endowment stream that
diﬀers from the original one in only one period. Then we ask how much
change in the current period wealth within the original endowment would
make the agent indiﬀerent to this new stream. The answer is called the
present value (PV).
To illustrate, this general deﬁnition entails the PV formula commonly
used in ﬁnancial bookkeeping. In this case, the present value of K dollars
received in time t is βtK, where β is usually taken to be 1/(1 + r) with
market interest rate r. It was shown by Bleichrodt et al. (2013) that this
particular formulation is justiﬁable only for a particular type of preference
once one adapts PV as described above. One important shortcoming of using
prescribed formulas for present value is that it ignores consumer preferences.
For example, the explicit expression for PV above does not allow the valua-
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tion of future monetary amounts to depend on current income or income in
other periods; whereas the PV used in this paper is the subjective valuation
of K dollars of time t as of today. Hence, it may depend on any relevant
variable. It is a subjective measure that does not assume any particular form
of preference for the agent.
The PV characterizations in this paper are intended to help researchers
who carry out experiments that test the validity of the aforementioned mod-
els. Most experiments on intertemporal choice models are inevitably carried
out from today’s point of view. For example, subjects are asked to submit
their evaluations of some future monetary changes as of today. The responses
they give are direct revelations of how they perceive future outcomes and this
is also what lies at the heart of the construction of PV: the idea of bring-
ing future outcomes back to today for evaluation, and allowing for the most
general form of doing so. Therefore as an empirical tool, PV is a natural
concept to be used in experiments since decision makers are already familiar
with the concept. Also, as the propositions below will make more clear, the
simple behavioral conditions I state on PV are more compact and more eas-
ily grasped than the behavioral conditions imposed on preference relations.
Hence the PV approach simpliﬁes the analysis and the testing of theories to
a great extent.
The idea of present value characterization instead of preference conditions
ﬁrst occurred in Bleichrodt et al. (2013) in which, decision models that
are more commonly used in economics and ﬁnance were characterized. In
this sense, I study some deviations from these benchmark models. At a
time when political correctness was not a requirement for academic papers,
Carver (1918) called behavior that is not in line with widely accepted norms
of economics, “eternally feminine”. Needless to say, I do not sympathize with
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the author’s approach of associating any behavior that does not comply with
certain norms, with femininity. Yet, as an analogy, this study is the “eternally
feminine” counterpart of our previous work, Bleichrodt et al. (2013). In
this respect, the intuitive PV characterizations below shed more light on
the rationale behind the behavior described by the relevant models. This
contributes to the discussions on the normative aspects of CDU model versus
its particular violations that are analyzed in this paper.
5.2 The Model
Let S = {0, . . . , n} be the set of time periods with 0 being the current time.
At each time point i, an individual receives a monetary outcome xi ∈ R.
That makes our object of study the streams of payments {x0, . . . , xn}. These
streams will sometimes be called prospects. Agents are assumed to have a
continuous, complete and transitive preference relation  on the set of all
such prospects, Rn+1.  and ∼ are the asymmetric and symmetric parts of
.
For any x ∈ Rn+1, and α ∈ R, αix denotes the prospect obtained by
replacing the ith component of x by α. Similarly, αiγjx replaces the i
th
and jth components of x by α and γ respectively for i = j. In addition to
being a continuous complete preorder,  will be assumed to satisfy strict
monotonicity throughout the paper.In other words, the following will hold
for :
For any two prospects x, y ∈ Rn+1, if xi ≥ yi ∀i ∈ S and xj > yj for at
least one j ∈ S, then x  y.
Present value is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 5.1. Suppose that an individual with preference relation  on
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Rn+1 is initially endowed with an income stream x ∈ Rn+1. Further, suppose
that x is changed by φ units only in period i. Then π is called the individual’s
present value of φ if it satisﬁes the following condition:
(x0 + π, x1, . . . xi, . . . , xn) ∼ (x0, . . . , xi + φ, . . . , xn) .
By continuity, existence of π is guaranteed. Due to strict monotonicity,
it is unique. In its most general form, the PV may depend on x, i, and φ,
and such dependence will be denoted by πi (x, φ) . In the case where any of
these variables is irrelevant for π, it will be omitted. It follows that the PV
of any amount received in period 0 is itself i.e., π0 (x, φ) = φ.
Given a preference relation  on an arbitrary set X, a function V : X →
R is called a representing function for , if for all x, y ∈ X, x  y if and only
if V (x) ≥ V (y). The CDU model assumes that the representing function for
 in the above setting takes the following form:
n∑
i=0
βiu(xi)
where, 0 < β < 1 discounts future outcomes and u is a real valued function
on monetary payoﬀs.
5.3 Variation Aversion
Consider the following example from Gilboa (1989). Preferences are deﬁned
on the set of income streams spread over four periods. In each period, the
payment can be high (H) or low (L). Assume that the agent dislikes variation
in her periodical payments and we observe the preferences below:
(H,H,L, L) ∼ (L,L,H,H)  (H,L,H, L) ∼ (L,H,L,H) (5.1)
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We observe the above preferences for such an agent because (H,H,L, L) and
(L,L,H,H) contain less variation than (H,L,H, L) and (L,H,L,H) between
periods. Such distaste for variation may be due to adjustment costs or psy-
chological reasons. Especially when this variation eﬀect is more pronounced
and opportunity cost is low (for instance, due to low interest rate or closely
spread time points), (5.1) can be observed Gilboa (1989) for a more detailed
discussion of such preferences). It can be seen from (5.1) that the constant
discounted utility model cannot accommodate these preferences. In fact, a
closer investigation shows that no additively separable representation can be
used in this case. In other words, even a representation of the general form∑3
i=0 ui(xi), where xi ∈ {H, T} cannot explain (5.1). In this section, I will
analyze a model developed by Gilboa (1989) that can explain (5.1).
As the underlying reasoning suggests, any attempt to model preferences
in (5.1) should take into account the variation in utility terms between pe-
riods, |u(xi) − u(xi−1)|. Gilboa (1989) introduced a preference condition,
the variation preserving sure thing principle, which leads to the following
representation:
n∑
i=0
(λiu(xi) + τi|u(xi)− u(xi−1)|). (5.2)
In (5.2), discounted utility is adjusted by a weighted sum of utility variations
in each period. Once these variations are incorporated, (5.2) can explain
distaste for ﬂuctuations in income. I take Gilboa’s model as benchmark and
give a characterization of (5.2) in terms of present value.
In the context of choice under uncertainty, Savage (1954) imposed a pref-
erence condition called sure thing principle (STP) to guarantee a represen-
tation that is additively separable among states. Gilboa’s (1989) variation
preserving sure thing principle is a modiﬁcation of this condition so that
non-separability among adjacent periods is allowed. This axiom is presented
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next.
Subsets of S of the form {i, i+1, . . . , j} for i ≤ j are called intervals and
are denoted by [i, j].
Deﬁnition 5.2. Let A = [i, j] ⊂ S be an interval and let x, x′, y, y′ ∈ Rn+1
be such that
xk = yk, x
′
k = y
′
k ∀k ∈ A
xk = x
′
k, yk = y
′
k ∀k ∈ Ac
xk = x
′
k = yk = y
′
k for k = i− 1, j + 1.
Then  is said to satisfy variation preserving sure thing principle if x  y if
and only if x′  y′.
This condition can be explained as follows. Suppose that x and y assume
common values on a subset A ⊂ S. Then the preference between them
does not change when the common values of these two prospects on A are
replaced with a diﬀerent common set of values, as long as -and this is where
it diﬀers from STP- this replacement does not alter the variation in x and y
in diﬀerent degrees. Deﬁne x−1 = xn+1 = 0. Gilboa (1989) gave the following
characterization of (5.2).
Theorem 5.1. (Gilboa 1989) The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) The representing function for  is of the following form:
n∑
i=0
(λiu(xi) + τi|u(xi)− u(xi−1)|)
for all x ∈ R, where u : R → R is unique up to an increasing aﬃne
transformation and
|λi| ≥ |τi|+ |τi+1| ∀i < n
|λn| ≥ |τn| and τ0 = 0.
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(ii)  satisﬁes variation preserving sure thing principle.
In the above theorem, u is interpreted as the utility function for monetary
outcomes. Since it is unique up to an increasing aﬃne transformation, we
can rescale it so as to get u(0) = 0. Then we have u(x−1) = u(xn+1) = 0.
The same argument is also valid for the main result below, Proposition 5.1.
5.3.1 Main Result
Instead of characterizing (5.2) by variation preserving sure thing principle,
I now present a simpler and empirically more operational axiomatization in
terms of present value behavior. Let Δ(α, β) denote the diﬀerence α− β.
Proposition 5.2. The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) The representing function for  is of the following form:
n∑
i=0
(λiu(xi) + τi|u(xi)− u(xi−1)|)
for all x ∈ R, where u : R → R is unique up to an increasing aﬃne
transformation and
|λi| ≥ |τi|+ |τi+1| ∀i < n
|λn| ≥ |τn| and τ0 = 0.
(ii) The present value so constructed in Deﬁnition 2.1 depends on
φ, i, x0, xi,Δ(x1, x0),Δ(xi, xi−1) and Δ(xi+1, xi):
π = πi(φ, x0, xi,Δ(x1, x0),Δ(xi, xi−1),Δ(xi+1, xi)).
For the result above, I will further assume1 that u is inﬁnitely diﬀereb-
tiable.
1Debreu (1972) gives behavioral conditions on diﬀerentiability.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
In Bleichrodt et al. (2013), it was shown that  can be represented
by an additively separable function
∑
ui if and only if the agent’s present
value depends on the amount given in the future, his current income, his
income at the period that the change happens and how far this period is
(i.e., π = πi(φ, x0, xi)). Thus for the agent described above, in addition to
these factors, variations that take place with respect to next period income
and the income right before and after the future distortion also aﬀect the
perception of present value. And this is all that is needed to characterize
such an agent. Compared to the variation preserving sure thing principle,
this is a shorter, easier and more intuitive condition. Therefore, it clariﬁes
the rationale behind such preferences. This section focused on the adjacent
period separability. According to Proposition 5.2, as long as an agent takes
the neighboring periods’ income levels into consideration in her evaluation
of future income changes, she deviates from the standard CDU. It would be
diﬃcult to claim that such consideration is irrational in any sense. Hence,
with this clariﬁcation it becomes easier to argue that additive separability
in intertemporal choice models is hard to defend from a normative point of
view.
5.4 Decreasing Impatience
In this section, I will put my framework in a broader context by extending the
results to a model developed by Prelec (2004). In addition to its additively
separable form, one of the most distinctive features of CDU is that the degree
of impatience for a given length of period stays the same no matter how far
this period is from today. More formally, if x ∈ Rn+1, α, β ∈ R satisfy
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αi0i+kx ∼ 0iβi+kx for some i ∈ S, then αi′0i′+kx ∼ 0i′βi′+kx for all i′ ∈ S
as long as i′ + k ≤ n. For example, if you are indiﬀerent between 10 dollars
today and 11 dollars in one week; then according to CDU, you should be in
diﬀerent between 10 dollars in eight weeks and 11 dollars in nine weeks.
This property of CDU has been challenged on empirical grounds (Thaler
(1981), Loewenstein & Prelec (1992)). These studies reveal that people do
prefer sooner but worse outcomes to better but later outcomes when the
comparisons are made for the near future. However, this preference reverses
as the comparisons are delayed and people accept to wait more to obtain
the better outcome. One way to explain such preferences has been to assert
that people tend to decrease their rate of discount for farther away future
outcomes. A particular functional form that incorporated this idea is the
quasi hyperbolic discounting utility function which is also one of the most
commonly used models as alternatives to CDU. In this model, any stream
x ∈ Rn+1 is evaluated by u(x0) + β
∑
i∈S\{0} δ
iu(xi). It has ﬁrst been used
by Phelps & Pollak (1968) and was further developed by Laibson (1997).
Numerous studies employed this functional form to explain economic phe-
nomena such as procrastination (O’Donoghue & Rabin (1999)) and addic-
tion (Gruber & Koszegi(2000)). It is a special case of a more general class
of preferences axiomatized by Prelec (2004), the decreasing impatience (DI)
preferences.2
Many studies on hyperbolic discounting and DI, including Prelec (2004),
deal with simple prospects (i.e. two dated outcomes x and y received in
periods t and s, denoted (x, t) and (y, s) respectively) but I study sequences
2Although commonly used in many studies nowadays, hyperbolic discounting or its
generalizations are not the only models that can accommodate the violations mentioned
above (see Rubinstein (2003)) for an alternative explanation and a critique of hyperbolic
discounting).
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of outcomes instead of such dated outcomes.
Prelec (2004) assumes that preferences are representable by the function∑n
i=0Φ(i)u(xi), where Φ : R → R is the discount function and u : R → R is
the utility function for monetary payoﬀs in each period. For the rest of this
section, this assumption will be maintained. The main result in Prelec (2004)
is that ln(Φ(i)) is convex (in other words proportional changes in time lead
to less and less discounting) if and only if the agent is decreasingly impatient.
DI is deﬁned as follows (generalized to the sequences of outcomes setting):
Deﬁnition 5.3.  exhibits DI if for all i, j, k ∈ S with i < j, i+k, j+k ∈ S,
α > β and x ∈ Rn+1, 0iαjx ∼ βi0jx implies 0iαj+kx  βi+k0jx (strict DI, if
the latter preference is strict).
We have the following result from Prelec (2004) adapted to the n−period
setting:
Theorem 5.3. (Prelec 2004) The following two statements are equivalent:
1.  satisﬁes DI.
2. ln(Φ(i)) is convex.
When  is representable by a function of the form
∑n
i=0Φ(i)u(xi), using
the deﬁnition of PV one can see that the present value of any amount φ given
at time i under an endowment x depends only on i, φ, x0 and xi:
π = πi(φ, x0, xi)
In accordance with the uniﬁed PV characterization system, I will provide
an alternative axiomatization as follows: In accordance with the uniﬁed PV
characterization system, I will provide an alternative axiomatization as fol-
lows:
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Proposition 5.4. The following two statements are equivalent:
1. The present value so constructed in Deﬁnition 5.1 satisﬁes the following:
For all x ∈ Rn+1, i, j, k ∈ S with i < j, i + k, j + k ∈ S and
φ, φ′ ∈ R with φ > φ′, if πj(φ, x0, 0) = πi(φ′, x0, 0), then πj+k(φ, x0, 0) ≥
πi+k(φ
′, x0, 0).
2. ln(Φ(i)) is convex.
Proof. See Appendix B
Therefore for those who are decreasingly impatient, the present value
depends on the amount given in the future, their current income, their income
at the period that change happens and also how far the change is. A DI
agent behaves as follows: While today’s worth of later but better outcome
is relatively small compared to the worth of sooner but worse outcome, this
changes as time elapses and he leans towards the better outcome since its
worth today improves relative to the sooner but worse outcome.
5.5 Conclusion
I presented a generalized present value foundation for two non-classical mod-
els of intertemporal choice, variation aversion and decreasing impatience. Al-
though my results are mainly analytical, my goal is to provide a natural road
map for experimental researchers who wish to test the validity of intertem-
poral decision models. In this respect, I presented easily implementable and
testable conditions in terms of present values for these models instead of less
tractable preference conditions.
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5.6 Appendices
Appendix 5.A: Proof of Proposition 5.2
Recall that present value, π, is deﬁned through the indiﬀerence
(x0 + π)0xix ∼ x0(xi + φ)ix. (5.3)
Suppose that the representing function for  is as in (i) in Proposition 5.2.
Then for i < n, (5.3) implies
λ0u(x0 + π) + τ1|u(x1)− u(x0 + π)|+ λiu(xi)+
τi|u(xi)− u(xi−1)|+ τi+1|u(xi+1)− u(xi)|
= λ0u(x0) + τ1|u(x1)− u(x0)|+ λiu(xi + φ)+
τi|u(xi + φ)− u(xi−1)|+ τi+1|u(xi+1)− u(xi + φ)|. (5.4)
Showing that (ii) holds is a matter of solving (5.4) for π for diﬀerent cases. I
believe that this arithmetic is not crucial for our purposes. Therefore I will
present the result for only one illustrative case:
u(x0) ≥ 0, φ > 0, xi ≥ xi−1, xi+1 ≥ xi + φ, (5.5)
and
Di
D0
(u(xi + φ)− u(xi)) ≤ u(x1)− u(x0) (5.6)
where Di = λi+ τi− τi+1, and D0 = λ0− τ1. We need (5.6) to determine the
sign of u(x1)− u(x0 + π) in (4). From (5.4), we get
D0u(x0 + π) +Diu(xi) = D0u(x0) +Diu(xi + φ)
Note that, D0 = 0, for otherwise one would have Di = 0 too and this
would lead (5.3) to hold true for inﬁnitely many values of π; which violates
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monotonicity. Hence, Di/D0 is well deﬁned. Then with the assumptions
made in (5.5) and (5.6), we have
π = u−1(u(x0) +
Di
D0
[u(xi + φ)− u(xi)])− x0. (5.7)
In (5.7), π depends on x0, xi and φ explicitly, and on i through Di in the
formula. Dependence on Δ(xi+1, xi) and Δ(xi, xi−1) is due to the conditions
assumed in (5.5). In (5.6), we see dependence of π on u(x1)−u(x0). Using a
Taylor expansion around x0, we translate this into a dependence on Δ(x1, x0)
(Recall that we assumed inﬁnite diﬀerentiability). We have
u(x1)− u(x0) =
∞∑
j=1
u(j)(x0)
j!
[Δ(x1, x0)]
j
where, u(j)(x0) is the j
th derivative of u at x0. Similarly,
u(xi − φ)− u(xi) =
∞∑
j=1
u(j)(xi)
j!
φj.
So in terms of explanatory variables for π, (5.6) gives us a dependence on
Δ(x1, x0), x0, xi and φ. The case for i = n is investigated in the same
manner, only noting that by deﬁnition xn+1 = 0. Therefore,
π = πi(φ, x0, xi,Δ(x1, x0),Δ(xi, xi−1),Δ(xi+1, xi)).
Conversely, assume that
π = πi(φ, x0, xi,Δ(x1, x0),Δ(xi, xi−1),Δ(xi+1, xi)).
I will show that  satisﬁes variation preserving sure thing principle which
will imply that it can be represented by (5.2). Let A = [i, j] ⊂ S be an
interval and x, x′, y, y′ ∈ Rn+1 be such that
xk = yk, x
′
k = y
′
k ∀k ∈ A
xk = x
′
k, yk = y
′
k ∀k ∈ Ac
xk = x
′
k = yk = y
′
k for k = i− 1, j + 1.
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Assume that j + 1 < n and suppose x  y. First I will consider indiﬀerence,
x ∼ y. I discount xks to period 0 one by one. For this purpose, let us deﬁne
the recursive sequence of pks as follows:
p0 = x0
p1 = p0 + πn(xn, p0, 0,Δ(x1, p0),Δ(0, xn−1),Δ(xn+1, 0))
p2 = p1 + πn−1(xn−1, p1, 0,Δ(x1, p1),Δ(0, xn−2),Δ(0, 0))
...
pk = pk−1 +
πn+1−k(xn+1−k, pk−1, 0,Δ(x1, pk−1),Δ(0, xn−k),Δ(0, 0)).
...
for 0 ≤ k ≤ n− (j + 2). Also, let
p˜1 = pn−(j+2) +
πi−2(xi−2, pn−(j+2), 0,Δ(x1, pn−(j+2)),Δ(0, xi−3),Δ(xi−1, 0))
p˜2 = p˜1 + πi−3(xi−3, p˜1, 0,Δ(x1, p˜1),Δ(0, xi−4),Δ(0, 0))
p˜3 = p˜2 + πi−4(xi−4, p˜2, 0,Δ(x1, p˜2),Δ(0, xi−5),Δ(0, 0))
...
p˜i−3 = p˜i−4 + π2(x2, p˜i−4, 0,Δ(x1, p˜i−4),Δ(0, x1),Δ(0, 0))
p˜i−2 = p˜i−3 + π1(x1, p˜i−3, 0,Δ(0, p˜i−3)Δ(p˜i−3, 0)Δ(0, 0)).
We apply the same procedure to y. I will call the resulting values p′ and p˜′;
analogous to p and p˜ deﬁned above. For notational simplicity, let p˜i−2 = Π
and p˜′i−2 = Π
′. Using the deﬁnition of present value, we get
x ∼ (p1, x1, . . . , xn−1, 0)
∼ (p2, x1, . . . , xn−2, 0, 0).
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Iteratively discounting each xk for k ∈ Ac \ {0, i− 1, j + 1, j + 2}, we obtain
x ∼ (Π, 0, . . . , 0, xi−1, . . . , xj+2, 0 . . . , 0). (5.8)
Similarly,
y ∼ (Π′, 0, . . . , 0, yi−1, . . . , yj+2, 0 . . . , 0). (5.9)
Rewriting Π and yj+2 as Π = Π
′ + (Π−Π′) and yj+2 = xj+2 + (yj+2 − xj+2)
respectively and using (8) and (9), we get
(Π′ + (Π− Π′), 0, . . . , 0, xi−1, . . . , xj+2, 0 . . . , 0) ∼
(Π′, 0, . . . , 0, yi−1, . . . , yj+1, xj+2 + (yj+2 − xj+2), 0 . . . , 0).
Then using the fact that yk = xk for k = i− 1, . . . , j + 1 results in
(Π′ + (Π− Π′), 0, . . . , 0, xi−1, . . . , xj+2, 0 . . . , 0) ∼
(Π′, 0, . . . , 0, xi−1, . . . , xj+1, xj+2 + (yj+2 − xj+2), 0 . . . , 0).
By the deﬁnition of present value, this means
πj+2(yj+2 − xj+2,Π′, 0, xj+1, xj+2, 0) = Π− Π′.
Since πj+2(.) is independent of xi, . . . , xj, we can replace these by x
′
i, . . . , x
′
j:
(Π′ + (Π− Π′), 0, . . . , 0, xi−1, x′i, . . . , x′j, xj+1, xj+2, 0 . . . , 0) ∼
(Π′, 0, . . . , 0, xi−1, x′i, . . . , x
′
j, xj+1, xj+2 + (yj+2 − xj+2), 0 . . . , 0).
Noting again that y′k = x
′
k for k = i− 1, . . . , j + 1, we have
(Π′ + (Π− Π′), 0, . . . , 0, xi−1, x′i, . . . , x′j, xj+1, xj+2, 0 . . . , 0) ∼
(Π′, 0, . . . , 0, yi−1, y′i, . . . , y
′
j, yj+1, xj+2 + (yj+2 − xj+2), 0 . . . , 0).
Recall that Π and Π′ are constructed by discounting each xk and yk to period
0. Now we apply the reverse operation to them and forward these components
back to their original positions. This gives
(Π′ + (Π− Π′), 0, . . . , 0, xi−1, x′i, . . . , x′j, xj+1, xj+2, 0 . . . , 0) ∼ x′
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and
(Π′, 0, . . . , 0, yi−1, y′i, . . . , y
′
j, yj+1, xj+2 + (yj+2 − xj+2), 0 . . . , 0) ∼ y′.
Hence,
x′ ∼ y′
as we wanted to show.
If x  y, then by solvability we can ﬁnd ε > 0, such that x ∼ (y0 +
ε, g1, . . . , yn). Afterwards, the same argument above is repeated to show that
x′  y′.
If j + 1 = n, then we start rolling xks and yks back to present time from
period i − 2 to obtain Π and Π′. Once Π and Π′ are deﬁned as such, the
rest of the proof follows the same steps as above, and once again we obtain
x′  y′. 
Appendix 5.B: Proof of Proposition 5.4
Suppose that statement i holds in the proposition. Recall that when the
preferences are representable by a a function of the form
∑n
i=0Φ(i)u(xi), π
depends on i, φ, x0 and xi in the context of Deﬁniton 5.1. Now take any
x ∈ Rn+1, i, j, k ∈ S with i < j, i + k, j + k ∈ S and φ, φ′ ∈ R with φ > φ′
that satisﬁes πj(φ, x0, 0) = πi(φ
′, x0, 0). Then by the deﬁnition of PV, one
has
(x0 + πj(φ, x0, 0))00ix ∼ φjx and
(x0 + πi(φ
′, x0, 0))00ix ∼ φ′ix.
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Since πj(.) does not depend on xi and πi(.) does not depend on xj, the
indiﬀerence relations above can be rewritten as
(x0 + πj(φ, x0, 0))00j0jx ∼ 0iφix and
(x0 + πi(φ
′, x0, 0))00i0jx ∼ φ′i0jx.
Then, since πj(φ, x0, 0) = πi(φ
′, x0, 0) we have
0iφjx ∼ φ′i0jx.
Statement (i) in Proposition 5.4 implies
πj+k(φ, x0, 0) ≥ πi(φ′, x0, 0).
Using the same argument above, we get
0iφj+kx  φ′i+k0jx.
Therefore, DI holds which implies that ln(Φ(i)) is convex.
Conversely, suppose that ln(Φ(i)) is convex. Then DI holds by Prelec’s
(2004) theorem. Applying the ﬁrst part of the proof from the reverse order,
we can see that statement i holds. 
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis consists of four papers on consumers’ decision making under un-
certainty and intertemporal choice. In the ﬁrst paper, we set up a lab ex-
periment to analyze how subjects update their beliefs and change their am-
biguity attitudes upon receipt of new information regarding the uncertainty.
We decomposed subjects’ ambiguity attitudes into two parts: pessimism and
likelihood insensitivity. We found that the eﬀect of new information was
relatively more pronounced in the likelihood insensitivity part with a consid-
erable decrease compared to a less signiﬁcant aﬀect on pessimist behavior.
Our results suggest that subjects deviate from expected utility for any level
of information, but we did observe that they become closer to being expected
utility maximizers as they received more information.
In the second paper, we placed the notion of independence in a decision
theoretic context and stated preference conditions through this new construct
to axiomatize decision rules for uncertainty. We showed that the symmetry of
independence (along with standard conditions) is necessary and suﬃcient for
the Bayesian model. This implies that many commonly used Non-Bayesian
decision rules cannot accommodate symmetry of independence. We discussed
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the implications of these impossibility results. We also showed that the two
stage model of Anscombe & Aumann would better ﬁt the theory if the order
of stages were reversed.
The third paper was about several models of intertemporal choice popu-
lar in economics and ﬁnance. Most of the empirical studies on intertemporal
choice involve eliciting consumer’s present values of future payments. There-
fore we introduced preference conditions purely based on subjective present
values to characterize the aforementioned models of intertemporal choice.
These new characterizations are more clear and natural because they are
built on something that subjects are more familiar with, instead of more
complex structures.
In the last paper, we extended our results from the third paper to a
broader context. The third paper had characterized more commonly used
rational choice models, whereas the last paper used the principles we had
developed there to analyze frequently observed empirical departures from
those rational models.
Through our results from these four papers mentioned above, we provided
new insights into individual behavior and its (ir)rationality within the context
of uncertainty and dynamic settings.
Chapter 7
Summary
In this thesis we provided new results in two important branches of individual
behavior in economics, namely choice under uncertainty and intertemporal
choice. Speciﬁcally we focused on rationality in these two ﬁelds by means of
four papers.
First we developed a method to decompose beliefs and ambiguity atti-
tudes. Through this separation, we were able to provide a theoretical analysis
of the eﬀect of receiving an uncertainty resolving piece of information on both
parts in isolation. Then to test our model empirically, we set up a lab ex-
periment to see how these components get aﬀected by the arrival of new
information separately. In our experimental framework, we elicited subjects’
ask prices of options that are Initial Public Oﬀerings for three diﬀerent in-
formation conditions regarding the past returns of the relevant option. We
found that pessimism component was relatively unaﬀected, whereas likeli-
hood insensitivity diminished as more information about the historical per-
formance of the stocks became available. We observed that the estimated
beliefs, when corrected for ambiguity attitudes, converged to true frequen-
cies. Subjects moved in the direction of subjective expected utility as more
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information was provided, however substantial deviations remained even in
the maximum information condition.
In our second paper, our focus was on an important aspect of decision
under uncertainty: independence. We stated preference conditions capturing
independence in a statistical sense, and examined independence in various
models of decision making under uncertainty. Leaving aside the standard
technical preference conditions, we showed that symmetry of independence
is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for Bayesian decision rule. Although
the symmetry of this basic notion appears to be natural, we showed that it
is in fact quite restrictive in the sense that no other decision rule can accom-
modate it. Nonsymmetric independencies can be applied to non-Bayesian
(ambiguity) models, where we derive their implications. In particular, these
implications reveal a problem for the two stage Anscombe-Aumann frame-
work, which is one of the most common frameworks in the ambiguity litera-
ture today. We show that this problem can be avoided if we simply reverse
the order of stages in this framework.
In the third paper of the thesis, we studied intertemporal choice. Existing
characterizations of intertemporal choice models involve axioms that are not
directed towards their empirical testability due to their theoretical nature.
Considering the fact that models have to be tested for their appropriateness
and accuracy, we presented new preference conditions based on a very natural
and intuitive concept, the present value, which serve this purpose. Lies in
the heart of our new characterizations is the independence this present value
from other relevant factors and variables. We showed how similar types
of preference conditions, imposing independence conditions between directly
observable quantities, can be developed for other multi-criteria optimization
problems and can simplify behavioral axiomatizations there.
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In our last paper, we provide an extension of our results from the third
paper. Despite its prevalence, constant discounted utility has frequently
been challenged on empirical grounds. As a result, many alternative models
have been proposed to explain violations of this model. The fourth paper of
the thesis studied two such models, namely variation aversion and decreasing
impatience, that can accommodate common violations of constant discounted
utility. It was shown that the functional forms in these models can easily be
characterized by conditions based on present value.
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Chapter 8
Dutch Summary
Dit proefschrift geeft nieuwe resultaten voor twee belangrijke gebieden van
individueel keuzegedrag in de economie, namelijk: keuzes onder onzekerheid
en intertemporele keuzes. In het bijzonder besteedt het aandacht aan ratio-
naliteit binnen deze twee gebieden. Dit proefschrift bestaat uit vier artikelen.
Ten eerste wordt een methode ontwikkeld om geloof te ontbinden in twee
componenten: subjectieve kans en attitude t.o.v. ambiguteit. Door deze
ontbinding wordt het mogelijk een theoretische analyse te geven van de
gesoleerde eﬀecten van het ontvangen van nieuwe informatie op de beide
componenten. Vervolgens, om de methode empirisch te toetsen, is een labo-
ratorium experiment opgezet om de genoemde gesoleerde eﬀecten te meten.
Vraagprijzen van proefpersonen worden gemeten van opties op Initial Public
Oﬀerenings, voor drie verschillende niveaus van informatie over opbrengsten
uit het verleden van de relevante opties. We vinden dat de pessimistische
(attitude) component vrijwel niet benvloed wordt, maar dat de likelihood
sensitivity (betreﬀende geloof) component duidelijk gereduceerd wordt naar-
mate meer informatie beschibaar komt. De geschatte subjectieve kansen con-
vergeren, na correctie voor ambiguteits attitude, naar de ware frequenties.
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Proefpersonen komen steeds dichter bij het klassieke subjectief verwachte
nut naarmate meer informatie verschaft wordt, maar er blijven substantile
afwijkingen zelfs bij het hoogste niveau van informatie.
Het tweede paper bekijkt een belangrijk aspect van beslissen bij onzeker-
heid: onafhankelijkheid. Preferentie-condities worden gegeven die onafhanke-
lijkheid in de statistische zin bepalen, en onafhankelijkheid in diverse mod-
ellen van beslissen bij onzekerheid. De standaard technische condities hier
buiten beschouwing latend, wordt getoond dat symmetrie van onafhanke-
lijkheid een nodige en voldoende voorwaarde is voor Bayesiaanse besliss-
ingsregels. Hoewel symmetrie van dit fundamentele concept natuurlijk li-
jkt, volgt in feite dat het beperkend is in de zin dat geen andere beslisregel
er aan kan voldoen. Niet-symmetrische onafhankelijkheden kunnen worden
toegepast in niet-Bayesiaanse (ambiguteits) modellen, waarvoor enige gevol-
gen worden afgeleid. In het bijzonder brengen deze gevolgen een probleem
aan het licht voor het twee-staps Anscombe-Aumann model, n van de popu-
lairste modellen voor ambiguteit. Het blijkt dat dit probleem vermeden kan
worden als we de volgorde van de twee stappen omkeren.
Het derde paper van dit proefschrift onderzoekt intertemporele keuzes.
Bestaande karakterisaties van intertemporele keuze-modellen gebruiken ax-
iomas die niet sterk gericht zijn op hun empirische toetsbaarheid. Omdat
modellen getoetst moeten worden op hun gepastheid en nauwkeurigheid,
levert dit paper nieuwe preferentie-condities die gebaseerd zijn op een zeer
natuurlijk en intutief concept: de contante waarde. Centraal in deze nieuwe
karakterisaties is de onafhankelijkheid van deze contante waarde van andere
factoren en variabelen. Getoond wordt hoe vergelijkbare typen van preferen-
tie condities, onafhankelijkheden opleggend aan direct observeerbare quanti-
tatieve grootheden, ontwikkeld kunnen worden voor andere multi-criteria op-
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timalisatie problemen en daar kunnen dienen om preferentie-axiomatiseringen
te vereenvoudigen.
Het laatste paper geeft een uitbreiding van de resultaten van het derde pa-
per. Zijn wijd verbreide toepassingen niettegenstaande, is het model van con-
stante discontering vaak bekritiseerd vanwege zijn vele empirische schendin-
gen. Dientengevolge zijn veel alternatieve modellen voorgesteld om de schendin-
gen te verklaren. Het vierde paper van die proefschrift bestudeert twee van
zulke alternatieve modellen, namelijk variatie-afkeer en dalende ongeduldigheid,
welke de schendingen van constante discontering kunnen verklaren. Deze vor-
men kunnen gemakkelijk gekarakteriseerd worden door condities gebaseerd
op contante waarden.
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